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ABSTRACT
Privacy is commonly studied as a private good: my personal data
is mine to protect and control, and yours is yours. This conception of
privacy misses an important component of the policy problem. An
individual who is careless with data exposes not only extensive
information about herself, but about others as well. The negative
externalities imposed on nonconsenting outsiders by such carelessness
can be productively studied in terms of welfare economics. If all
relevant individuals maximize private benefit, and expect all other
relevant individuals to do the same, neoclassical economic theory
predicts that society will achieve a suboptimal level of privacy. This
prediction holds even if all individuals cherish privacy with the same
intensity. As the theoretical literature would have it, the struggle for
privacy is destined to become a tragedy.
But according to the experimental public-goods literature, there is
hope. Like in real life, people in experiments cooperate in groups at
rates well above those predicted by neoclassical theory. Groups can
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be aided in their struggle to produce public goods by institutions, such
as communication, framing, or sanction. With these institutions,
communities can manage public goods without heavy-handed
government intervention. Legal scholarship has not fully engaged this
problem in these terms. In this Article, we explain why privacy has
aspects of a public good, and we draw lessons from both the
theoretical and the empirical literature on public goods to inform the
policy discourse on privacy.
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We must all hang together, or assuredly we shall all hang
separately.
– Benjamin Franklin
INTRODUCTION
Your privacy is not yours alone. The data that a person produces
1
concerns both herself and others. Being cautious with personal data
is therefore not enough. Individuals are vulnerable merely because
others have been careless with their data. As a result, privacy
2
protection requires group coordination. Failure of coordination
means a failure of privacy. In short, privacy is a public good.
A public good is a social benefit that risks not being produced
because everyone can share in it equally, whether they contribute to it
3
or not. In the technical language of economics, a public good is a
4
nonrival and nonexcludable resource. Such goods pose a social
dilemma—although society is better off if the good is produced, it is
against each individual’s best interest to expend resources
5
contributing to the production of the good. Public goods run the
6
gamut, from clean air to national defense. Consumption by one
person does not affect consumption by another, and no one can be
7
excluded from consuming. A public bad is the mathematical mirror

1. See Mark MacCarthy, New Directions in Privacy: Disclosure, Unfairness and
Externalities, 6 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 425, 429 (2011) (“The idea is that disclosure
of information by some people can reveal information about other people, to their detriment.”).
2. See Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1927 (2013)
(“Privacy rights protect individuals, but to understand privacy simply as an individual right is a
mistake. The ability to have, maintain, and manage privacy depends heavily on the attributes of
one’s social, material, and informational environment.”).
3. See infra Part II.A; see also RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF
EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 9 (2d ed. 1996) (laying out the general
theory of public goods).
4. CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 3, at 9 (“The benefits of private goods are fully rival
and excludable, whereas the benefits of pure public goods are nonrival and nonexcludable.
From the foregoing examples, we see that food and fuel are private, whereas strategic weapons
and pollution control are purely public goods.”).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 8–9.

FAIRFIELD AND ENGEL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

11/20/2015 3:26 PM

388

[Vol. 65:385

DUKE LAW JOURNAL
8

image of a public good. A public bad imposes costs, not on any one
person, but rather on everyone. Public bads, like polluted water or
filthy air, are mathematically identical to public goods, with only the
framing of the question differing—are we creating something from
which we all benefit (clean air) or avoiding the creation of something
9
that harms everyone (smog)?
An extensive behavioral-economics literature, much of it
experimental, focuses on tools that groups can use to solve social
10
dilemmas. Yet that literature has not yet addressed privacy as a
11
public good. The legal literature on privacy suffers from a similar
12
lacuna. Despite many theorists’ statements that privacy has an
13
important social dimension, we have found no approach that mines
the behavioral or experimental literature for group tools to resist the
social dilemma of privacy. This Article fills that gap.
By applying tools from behavioral and experimental economics
to the still-intractable legal problem of privacy, we hope to shift the
debate surrounding privacy protection. If the theories espoused here
are correct, and we believe the science strongly shows they are, the

8. Bruce Yandle, Mixed Goods and Bads, 19 PUB. CHOICE 95, 95–96 (1974); Kenneth R.
Richards, Framing Environmental Policy Instrument Choice, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F.
221, 268 (2000).
9. See generally James Andreoni, Warm-Glow Versus Cold-Prickle: The Effects of Positive
and Negative Framing on Cooperation in Experiments, 110 Q. J. ECON. 1 (1995) (exploring how
the framing of outcomes as public goods or bads affects participant choice).
10. This existing body of knowledge is summarized by John O. Ledyard, Public Goods: A
Survey of Experimental Research, in THE HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 111,
141–69 (J.H. Kagel & A.E. Roth eds., Princeton 1995); Ananish Chaudhuri, Sustaining
Cooperation in Laboratory Public Goods Experiments: A Selective Survey of the Literature, 14
EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 47, 47–83 (2011); Jennifer Zelmer, Linear Public Goods Experiments: A
Meta-Analysis, 6 EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 299, 304–07 (2003).
11. See generally Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Public Goods, Social
Pressure, and the Choice Between Privacy and Publicity, 2 AM. ECON. J. MICROECONOMICS 191
(2010) (modeling a different situation in which contributing to a public good sends a signal
about its type that would be individually profitable to keep confidential); Richard Posner, The
Economics of Privacy, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 405 (1981) (comparing an individual’s demands for
privacy with a seller’s demands to conceal product defects and theorizing that the protection of
privacy is economically inefficient); Stefan Dodds, Privacy and Endogenous Monitoring Choice
when Private Information is a Public Good (Queen’s Univ. Econ. Dep’t, Working Paper No.
1010, 2002), http://qed.econ.queensu.ca/working_papers/papers/qed_wp_1010.pdf [http://
perma.cc/SVT9-ZXC2] (focusing on the opposite case where sharing the information is
individually detrimental but socially beneficial).
12. See infra Parts I.C–D; see also MacCarthy, supra note 1, at 429 (“[T]here has not been
sufficient attention paid to the idea that certain contexts of information disclosure and data
analytics can reveal information about people other than the data subject.”).
13. See infra Part I.D.
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manner in which law addresses privacy will and must undergo a sea
change. Today’s social, legal, and self-regulatory tools focus on
empowering individuals. They must equally be focused on
empowering groups.
Individual empowerment is not enough because an individual’s
disclosure of information about herself impacts many other people.
One source of risk is immediate and palpable—information about
14
one person is also information about others. If a machine learning
algorithm knows where someone is at a given time, it can predict
where a spouse or friend is as well. Another source of risk is remote
and concealed, but potentially even more dangerous. Big data
15
companies collect large amounts of information about everyone.
16
They then mine this data for patterns. A single cue may facilitate an
inference regarding information an individual has chosen not to
reveal, or perhaps even something she did not know about herself.
For instance, imagine paying higher insurance premiums because a
sibling has cancer, or because a parent posts something about his
heart disease, or a relative self-identifies as suffering from a particular
17
mental illness. Alternatively, imagine not receiving a job offer
because an algorithm has identified that the distance an employee
18
lives from work strongly correlates with higher turnover.
The single-cue examples presented above are only the tip of the
iceberg. The true power of big data rests on combining arrays of
19
information. Consider Facebook, which recently applied for a patent
14. See Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1939
(2013) (“Big Data is notable not just because of the amount of personal information that can be
processed, but because of the ways data in one area can be linked to other areas and produce
new inferences and findings.”).
15. See MacCarthy, supra note 1, at 431 (“[T]he biggest dangers associated with online
behavioral advertising might come from the possible secondary use of the profiles and analytics
constructed to enable targeted advertising.”).
16. See Richards, supra note 14, at 1939 (“Big Data is fundamentally networked. Its value
comes from the patterns that can be derived by making connections between pieces of data,
about an individual, about individuals in relation to others, about groups of people, or simply
about the structure of information itself.”); Jordan Ellenberg, What’s Even Creepier than Target
Guessing that You’re Pregnant?, SLATE: HOW NOT TO BE WRONG (June 9, 2014), http://
www.slate.com/blogs/how_not_to_be_wrong/2014/06/09/big_data_what_s_even_creepier_than_
target_guessing_that_you_re_pregnant.html [http://perma.cc/E68S-UP4C].
17. See MacCarthy, supra note 1, at 450 (“If a data collector knows the independent
variable in that circumstance, it can use the regularity to infer the presence of the dependent
variable, even when the people involved have not revealed the presence of that characteristic
and it cannot be found in public records.”).
18. See id. at 450–51 (discussing how big data impacts eligibility decisions).
19. See Richards, supra note 14.
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for inferring the creditworthiness of an individual based on the
financial responsibility of the people in that individual’s social
20
network. Each person’s financial decisions feed into the algorithm’s
21
decisions about whether to extend others a loan. Moreover, the
array of cues that might play into the determination of each
individual’s financial responsibility (or any other attribute) can be
vast and of varying precision. Sometimes a combination of cues is so
tightly related to the unobserved information that it gives rise to a
strong inference. For example, one study demonstrated that 87
percent of the U.S. population can be uniquely identified just from
22
zip code, gender, and date of birth. In some instances the inference
23
might be wrong, but those relying on the cue pattern often do not
24
care because they can afford to err on the side of caution. For
example, an insurance company may prefer to lose a few customers
rather than insure individuals whose relationships indicate a greater
likelihood of expensive genetically linked illness.
Individual control of data is a fundamentally flawed concept
because individuals cannot know what the data they reveal means
when aggregated with billions of other data points. For example,
people who buy felt pads for their furniture are more likely to pay
back loans because they are conscientious with their belongings;
people who log into their credit-card accounts at 1:00 a.m. may be
showing signs of financial anxiety; and people who use credit cards at
drinking establishments are more likely to default on loans than
25
people who use credit cards at the dentist. Big data firms learn these
things by gathering colossal datasets from millions of people and
20. See Susie Cagle, Facebook Wants to Redline Your Friends List, PAC. STANDARD MAG.
(Aug. 24, 2015), http://www.psmag.com/nature-and-technology/mo-friends-mo-problems-mighthave-to-defriend-joey-with-the-jet-ski-bankruptcy [http://perma.cc/TY87-MBBF].
21. Id. (“In short: You could be denied a loan simply because your friends have defaulted
on theirs. It’s the kind of digital redlining that critics of ‘big data’ collection have been warning
of for years.”).
22. See LATANYA SWEENEY, CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV., SCHOOL OF COMP. SCI., DATA
PRIVACY LAB., RE-IDENTIFICATION OF DE-IDENTIFIED SURVEY DATA (2000).
23. See Tim Harford, Big Data: Are We Making a Big Mistake?, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2014),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/21a6e7d8-b479-11e3-a09a-00144feabdc0.html [http://perma.cc/HMR8WHPD] (detailing the problem of attributing cause to highly correlated data points in found
datasets).
24. See MacCarthy, supra note 1, at 455 (“These indirect disclosures are usually
probabilistic rather than certain.”).
25. Charles Duhigg, What Does Your Credit Card Company Know About You?, N.Y.
TIMES MAG. (May 12, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/17/magazine/17credit-t.html?page
wanted=all&_r=0 [http://perma.cc/E2W2-VPY8].

FAIRFIELD AND ENGEL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

PRIVACY AS A PUBLIC GOOD

11/20/2015 3:26 PM

391

mining the resulting pools of information. No matter how healthy or
creditworthy or committed to work a person may be, he might not
receive a home loan, job offer, or affordable insurance, because of
correlations ascertained from others’ data.
If you believe in the effectiveness of incentivizing, informing, and
empowering individual citizens to protect their own privacy, this is
very bad news. As long as the immediate benefit from disclosing your
data exceeds the ensuing long-term risk for your own privacy, you will
give away your data. This prediction holds even if all individuals
cherish privacy with the same intensity. If neoclassical economic
theory is correct, the struggle for privacy is destined to become a
26
tragedy.
But all hope is not lost. Both in the field and under the tightly
controlled conditions of a lab, groups have effectively produced
27
public goods. The tragedy can be overcome. Good will alone,
however, is not enough. Instead, group rules or structural conditions
(called “institutions”) must trigger and channel contributors’ sense of
28
altruism and equity. This works even better if an institution actively
29
foments cooperation. Luckily, privacy is by no means the only public
good. Clean air, safety, roads, and the common defense all share the
30
same incentive structure. Privacy policy thus need not reinvent the
26. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968)
(theorizing that when given a choice, individuals will act in a way that is beneficial to
themselves, even though the collective actions of all such individuals will be detrimental both to
themselves and society as a whole). For an application to privacy and information, see Dennis
D. Hirsch, Protecting the Inner Environment: What Privacy Regulation Can Learn from
Environmental Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 1, 10 (2006) [hereinafter Hirsch, Inner Environment]
(“Privacy injuries, much like environmental damage, accordingly qualify as ‘negative
externalities.’ If left unchecked, these privacy-infringing industries will ultimately destroy the
very resources on which they themselves depend. This will generate the same kind of ‘tragedy of
the commons’ that environmental laws were designed to alleviate.”).
27. See, e.g., Ledyard, supra note 10, at 121 (noting that people do make contributions to
the public good, that “[f]ace to face communication improves the rate of contribution,” and that
“the public goods problem is not as bad as some economists make it out to be”).
28. See Andreoni, supra note 9, at 13 (“[C]ooperation in public goods experiments cannot
be explained by pure altruism that subjects may have for each other. . . . Instead there must be
some asymmetry in the way people feel personally about doing good for others versus not doing
bad: the warm-glow must be stronger than the cold-prickle.”).
29. See, e.g., James Andreoni & Larry Samuelson, Building Rational Cooperation, 127 J.
ECON. THEORY 117, 122 (2006) (“A player thus prefers that his opponent cooperate, and finds
cooperation relatively more attractive the more likely is the opponent to cooperate.”).
30. See, e.g., CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 3, at 517 (“The selling price differential
between two houses whose characteristics are the same except for air quality provides a
measure for the private willingness to pay for the public good of clean air.”); Paul M. Schwartz,
Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055, 2084–85 (2004) [hereinafter
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wheel; it can benefit from solutions developed and tested in these
areas. From this perspective, privacy is no longer a tragedy, but it
remains a drama, calling for vigilance and, ideally, intervention in the
form of group-empowering institutions that enable sustained
31
cooperation in the face of a social dilemma.
Inattention to privacy’s public-good nature has led privacy policy
32
astray. In the absence of public-policy attention to privacy’s group
dimension, individual consumers have been left to negotiate,
unsuccessfully, with companies over the use of their data. Private
companies have accumulated deep and potentially toxic pools of
consumer data, and have made this data available to governments
33
with few legal safeguards. Social-media networks have become the
34
business end of dragnet surveillance. The transition to mobile
computing and its attendant geolocation data exacerbates the
35
Systems designed to use geolocation to deliver
problem.

Schwartz, Property] (“From this perspective, information privacy functions as a type of public
good, like clean air or national defense.”).
31. See COMM. ON THE HUMAN DIMENSIONS OF GLOBAL CHANGE, NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS (Elinor Ostrom et al. eds., National Academy Press
2002) [hereinafter DRAMA].
32. See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the
Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247, 266–69 (2011).
33. See Tom Hamburger, Privacy Rights Need Urgent Protection in Washington, Activists
Say, WASH. POST (Feb. 24, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/consumer-privacyrights-need-urgent-protection-in-washington-activists-say/2014/02/24/1764ba22-9cb7-11e3-975d107dfef7b668_story.html [http://perma.cc/QG8M-W3JV] (“Privacy protection demands have
increased in recent months as data-collection companies face new pressure from European
regulators alarmed by disclosure of U.S. government spying.”); Bruce Schneier, The Tech Lab:
Bruce Schneier, BBC (Feb. 26, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7897892.stm [http://
perma.cc/FJA8-GBVA] (“Data is the pollution of the information age. It’s a natural by-product
of every computer-mediated interaction. It stays around forever, unless it’s disposed of. It is
valuable when reused, but it must be done carefully. Otherwise, its after-effects are toxic. And
just as 100 years ago people ignored pollution in our rush to build the Industrial Age, today
we’re ignoring data in our rush to build the Information Age.”).
34. See Bruce Schneier, Don’t Listen to Google and Facebook: The Public-Private
Surveillance Partnership is Still Going Strong, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 25, 2014, 11:08 AM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/03/don-t-listen-to-google-and-facebookthe-public-private-surveillance-partnership-is-still-going-strong/284612 [http://perma.cc/M8PEZBCJ] (“Google, and by extension, the U.S. government, still has access to your
communications on Google’s servers.”).
35. See Brian Fung, Verizon Transparency Report Reveals 320,000 Data Requests in 2013,
WASH. POST: THE SWITCH (Jan. 22, 2014, 12:17 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/theswitch/wp/2014/01/22/verizon-transparency-report-reveals-320000-data-requests-in-2013 [http://
perma.cc/YRZ4-ENG4].
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advertisements to mobile devices serve as tools of political
36
oppression.
Policymakers must change tack to effectively moderate this
trend. Well-meaning legislators, judges, and regulators have focused
almost exclusively on two elements: individual consumer
37
comprehension (notice), and individualized control (choice). We
support these efforts, but believe that other approaches offer greater
value, in particular approaches that arm groups against social
dilemmas.
This Article starts that conversation and provides some framing
principles to promote collective action on privacy. We take seriously
the as-yet unanswered call for more extensive study of privacy as a
38
public good. We further think that the behavioral-economics
literature—which asks how people actually behave in these
situations—draws a clearer picture than the excessively rigorous pure39
theory public goods of neoclassical economics.
In neoclassical economics, a dilemma results from a difference
40
between individual and social benefit. The individual is best off if

36. See Andrew E. Kramer, Ukraine’s Opposition Says Government Stirs Violence, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/22/world/europe/ukraine-protests.html
[http://perma.cc/D2VJ-364C] (detailing the use of cell phone site location technology to deliver
threats to protesters).
37. See Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: Plan to Protect Privacy in the Internet
Age by Adopting a Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights (Feb. 23, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.
gov/the-press-office/2012/02/23/fact-sheet-plan-protect-privacy-internet-age-adopting-consumerprivacy-b [https://perma.cc/83CJ-JZLV]; Jennifer Martinez, Markey Introduces Mobile Privacy
Bill, THE HILL (Sept. 12, 2012, 5:46 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/technology/249055-markeyintroduces-mobile-privacy-bill [http://perma.cc/JG4Y-MNKJ]; Somini Sengupta, Web Privacy
Becomes a Business Imperative, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/04/
technology/amid-do-not-track-effort-web-companies-race-to-look-privacy-friendly.html?page
wanted=all [http://perma.cc/N7GH-3HDP] (“Privacy is no longer just a regulatory headache.
Increasingly, Internet companies are pushing each other to prove to consumers that their data is
safe and in their control.”).
38. See PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES,
AND PUBLIC POLICY 228, 231 (1995) (“Recognition that privacy has some features of a public or
collective good would make clearer the institutional or organizational interests in personal
information and the weaknesses of a market solution in providing privacy protection.”).
39. See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1473 (1998) (suggesting incorporating behavioral
economics into law and economics and noting that “[t]he absence of sustained and
comprehensive economic analysis of legal rules from a perspective informed by insights about
actual human behavior makes for a significant contrast with many other fields of economics,
where such ‘behavioral’ analysis has become relatively common”).
40. See Richard Warner & Robert H. Sloan, Behavioral Advertising: From One-Sided
Chicken to Informational Norms, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 49, 55 (2012) (“Collective action
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she ignores the negative or positive effects that her action entails for
41
others. This holds even if the individual foresees that all other
42
relevant outsiders will behave the same way. She then foresees that
she will suffer severely from others’ inflicting harm on her, or
43
withholding socially desirable behavior. Even so, if she is the only
one to take the ramifications of her actions on others into account,
she will be even worse off. Others would suffer a little less, or they
would gain a little, but she would experience less benefit than all
44
other selfish individuals would enjoy collectively. If she expects all
others to be selfish, she has no incentive to consider the common
45
good herself.
The neoclassical literature therefore supposes that individually
informed and empowered actors will act against group social
46
welfare. But experimental literature shows repeatedly that the
47
neoclassical picture is too pessimistic. A rich literature has tested
and rejected the theoretical prediction that groups will completely fail
48
to produce public goods.

problems are situations in which everyone is worse off if everyone does what he individually
prefers to do.”).
41. Id.
42. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral
Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1765–66 (2001) (discussing how
trustworthy people expect others to also be trustworthy, and vice versa).
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 1751 (noting that the neoclassical model is one of “human behavior driven by
rational self-interest”); Jennifer L. Radner, Phone, Fax, and Frustration: Electronic Commercial
Speech and Nuisance Law, 42 EMORY L.J. 359, 404–05 (1993) (“Further, the [neoclassical]
model assumes that individuals are able to accurately judge their own welfare and that their
decisions will not be dependent upon the welfare of others.”); see generally CORNES &
SANDLER, supra note 3 (presenting a theoretical framework of externalities); TODD SANDLER,
GLOBAL COLLECTIVE ACTION (2004) (analyzing factors that affect the success or failure of
collective action); TODD SANDLER, COLLECTIVE ACTION: THEORY AND APPLICATION (1992)
(providing a summary of collective-action research); Hardin, supra note 26 (introducing
Hardin’s well-known theory).
47. Surveys are provided by Chaudhuri, supra note 10, at 56–59; Ledyard, supra note 10, at
111; and Zelmer, supra note 10, at 304–08.
48. See, e.g., Robert J. Aumann & Lloyd S. Shapley, Long Term Competition—A Game
Theoretic Analysis, in COLLECTED PAPERS: R.J. AUMANN 395, 396 (1992) (concluding that
“individual self-interest in [certain] situations can in fact dictate a kind of cooperative
behavior”); David M. Kreps, Paul Milgrom, John Roberts & Robert Wilson, Rational
Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 245, 245–52
(1982) (presenting “how reputation effects due to informational asymmetries can generate
cooperative behavior in finitely repeated versions of the classic prisoners’ dilemma”); Reinhard
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When humans enter the lab, they resist public-goods problems
and attempt to cooperate at rates well above that which theory would
49
50
predict. They struggle. Often, given the math of the experiments,
they are doomed to ultimate failure, but they struggle nonetheless.
Different features of the collective-action environment mean that
51
their struggles have more or less success. Following Nobel Prize
winner Elinor Ostrom, we term this struggle the drama of the
52
commons. If game theory were entirely correct, a community facing
a problem that has the properties of a public good would be doomed
to tragedy. The community would suffer maximum damage. Luckily
53
54
both in the lab and in the field this prediction is too gloomy. Some
communities in some contexts have found viable and sustainable ways
to overcome the dilemma.
Consequently, groups must be given tools to create the public
good of privacy and resist the public bad of readily available intrusive
information (which one might call “data pollution”). Informing and
empowering individual players does not resolve a social dilemma. It is
precisely the fully informed, rational, and empowered individual who
knows she is better off contributing fully to a public bad, and free
55
riding on a public good, regardless of the actions of others. The
relevant legal tools therefore should be redesigned to focus less on

Selten, The Chain Store Paradox, 9 THEORY & DECISION 127, 127–59 (1978) (presenting three
levels of individual decisionmaking that help to refute basic game-theory assumptions).
49. See Blair & Stout, supra note 42, at 1761 (“[I]ndividuals in social dilemma experiments
exhibit far more cooperative behavior than can possibly be explained by external incentives.”).
50. See id. at 1761–62 (noting that individuals essentially show two personalities in
experimental social-dilemma contexts, and “[w]hen the competitive personality is dominant, an
individual will choose options that maximize her personal payoffs without regard for effects on
others . . . [and w]hen the cooperative personality governs, an individual will choose options that
maximize group welfare over options that maximize her own”).
51. See id. at 1768 (“[A] . . . key empirical finding from the social dilemma studies is that
even high trusters, in the right circumstances, predictably choose to defect rather than
cooperate. The key appears to be whether, when faced with a new situation that presents social
dilemma payoffs, an individual categorizes it as a competitive task or a cooperative task.”).
52. See DRAMA, supra note 31, at 4.
53. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text.
54. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 1 (1990) (“[C]ommunities of individuals have relied
on institutions resembling neither the state nor the market to govern some resource systems
with reasonable degrees of success over long periods of time.”).
55. See Robyn M. Dawes & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Cooperation, 1988 J. ECON.
PERSP. 187, 196 (“Perhaps we need to give more attention to ‘sensible cooperators.’”).
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individual knowledge and empowerment and more on facilitating
56
groups’ collective protection of their privacy.
This Article mines the behavioral-economics literature to find
new approaches to privacy protection that permit groups to sustain
cooperation and protect privacy even without direct government
intervention. We suggest a focus on empowering groups. We suggest
leveraging inequity aversion, reciprocity, and normativity to lessen
57
exploitation among group members. We suggest positive framing to
58
promote altruism. We suggest that communication and (private)
59
sanctions are key components of group coordination. With these
tools, groups may be able to sustain privacy without governmental
60
intervention and the challenges and distortions that flow therefrom.
The balance of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains
the gap in law and policy by describing first how data mining can
cause one person’s data to negatively impact others before analyzing
why privacy theory has had trouble proposing ways to contain these
harms. Part II lays out the case for treating privacy as a public good as
strictly defined in the economics literature, and Part III describes
methods and tools drawn from the behavioral and theoretical
literature that will empower groups to collectively protect privacy.
I. THE GAP IN LAW AND POLICY
Just about every middle schooler understands that a fundamental
problem of privacy online is not what one says about oneself, but
61
what others say. Big data exacerbates this problem beyond gossip
and thoughtless comments. Big data allows users to reveal critical

56. Cf. Cohen, supra note 2, at 1927.
57. See David A. Dana, Adequacy of Representation After Stephenson: A
Rawlsian/Behavioral Economics Approach to Class Action Settlements, 55 EMORY L.J. 279, 303
(2006) (noting the influence of inequality aversion on class-action settlements).
58. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2463, 2512 (2004) (“Options that are packaged as gains (for example, ‘lives saved’) induce risk
aversion; when the very same choices are packaged as losses (‘lives lost’), they induce risk
taking because of loss aversion.”).
59. See Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordination, Game
Theory, and Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 209, 218 (2009) (noting that law serves as a mechanism for
cooperation and coordination).
60. See id.; Blair & Stout, supra note 42, at 1771 (“[A]llowing the players to communicate
with each other in a social dilemma significantly increases the incidence of cooperation.”).
61. See Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma,
126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1892 (2013) [hereinafter Solove, Introduction] (“Additionally, privacy
self-management fails to account for the social impacts of individual privacy decisions.”).
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information about other people without understanding they are doing
62
so. Even by revealing personal interests and disinterests, users train
machine-learning algorithms to predict the behavior of other people,
63
forming the basis for targeted behavioral advertising, and creating
the potential for abuse by other interested actors.
This Part explores the need for policymakers to fully engage with
privacy as a public good. Our specific goals in this Part are to
underscore the importance of treating privacy as a social dilemma by
showing how the data we share about one another can form toxic
pools; to discuss privacy theory’s overinvestment in individualcentered theories of privacy; to demonstrate the resulting lacuna in
the legal literature on the subject of privacy as a public good as
strictly defined by the economics literature; and thus to establish the
necessity of our contribution: mining the behavioral- and empiricaleconomics literature for tools to arm groups against the social
dilemma of privacy.
A. Limitations on Scope
Privacy theory has long attempted to define privacy in terms of
64
its core or constitutive elements. We do not take this approach.
Rather than seeking to define privacy, we seek to provide tools that
help groups minimize the damage caused by information-based social
dilemmas. Our approach is consistent with most definitions of
privacy, because we suggest not a definition, but a set of institutional
features that permit groups to sustain cooperation. Our agnosticism
as to any single definition of privacy necessarily colors our approach
62. See Terence J. Lau, Towards Zero Net Presence, 25 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL’Y 237, 244 (2011) (“Most users do not realize, however, that the information they post on
social media websites can sometimes yield unintended consequences.”); MacCarthy, supra note
1, at 448 (“[A]n individual’s decision to share information with a data collector imposes costs on
other individuals. . . . [T]here is leakage of information about individuals who do not themselves
choose to reveal it.”); Richards, supra note 14, at 1939; Solove, Introduction, supra note 61, at
1881 (“It is virtually impossible for people to weigh the costs and benefits of revealing
information or permitting its use or transfer without an understanding of the potential
downstream uses, further limiting the effectiveness of the privacy self-management
framework.”).
63. See, e.g., Riva Richmond, As ‘Like’ Buttons Spread, So Do Facebook’s Tentacles, N.Y.
TIMES: BITS (Sept. 27, 2011, 3:51 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/27/as-like-buttonsspread-so-do-facebooks-tentacles/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 [http://perma.cc/T7DT-TY
7C].
64. See Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1099–1123
(2002) [hereinafter Solove, Privacy] (gathering and challenging essentialist conceptions of
privacy).
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to the legal literature that attempts to define privacy. We find these
attempts to capture the essence of privacy in a definition interesting,
but ultimately orthogonal to our approach. We instead offer an
approach that may permit groups to protect what they consider to be
private at significantly lower cost, and with reduced need for
government intervention. The goal is to kick off future debate about
the value of continuing with an individual-focused approach to
privacy protection. The practical result of this limitation in scope is
that we do not believe that adherence to any particular school of
thought regarding what privacy is (with the narrow exception of some
elements of privacy as individualized control, to which we return
below) detracts from the approach advanced here.
A second caveat: information produces both positive and
negative network effects, and both positive and negative
65
externalities. This Article takes no position on the upside of
information gathering, or on whether the gains from information
gathering outweigh the privacy losses. To us, it does not matter:
minimizing privacy costs associated with data accumulation is one
way to maximize the net gains or reduce the net losses. To provide an
example, suppose the government (or Apple, or Google) gathered
everyone’s healthcare data and parsed it with big data tools. Some
people would suffer adverse healthcare decisions (for example,
insurance-premium raises, inadequate coverage, and high
deductibles) based on this data. Others would benefit from cures we
might be able to tease from the mass of correlations. Both can be
simultaneously true. Our approach seeks to minimize the downside of
this function, not to argue the upside does not exist.
In some situations, individuals will evaluate the same degree of
information revelation differently. For example, if I have already
been diagnosed with a socially stigmatized illness and am in the
hospital, I may not be particularly concerned about this information
being used by some online platform. Possibly, all I care about is
medicine advancing fast enough to prolong my life. By contrast,
others may have a very strong interest in keeping the same piece of
information confidential since they fear losing their jobs. Defining the
optimal solution for such conflicts resulting from deep heterogeneity
is beyond the scope of this Article. Given that privacy as a public

65. See Jane R. Bambauer, The New Intrusion, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 205, 227 (2012)
(“[P]rivacy losses are the negative externalities from an otherwise productive and worthwhile
activity—information flow.”).
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good is not on the scholarly or policymaking radar, we deem it
important to first explain why this perspective is often appropriate.
We leave it to future work to explore the qualification resulting from
deep heterogeneity.
B. Toxic Data Accumulation
Central to our thesis is the idea that large pools of data
accumulated over time and from many different sources can exert a
66
corrosive effect on social welfare. Two salient features of
accumulated data make it potentially toxic. The first is that data
accumulates across time. Humans do not remember contributing the
information and do not take precautions against misuse. The second
feature is that data accumulates across sources. Again, humans do not
adequately account for the fact that what they tell one counterparty
will be communicated many times to many others. In both senses, the
accumulated data is experienced as toxic: it can harm people in ways
they did not foresee.
Because of these effects, security expert Bruce Schneier has
67
called data “the pollution of the information age.” Stale data can
cause damage because of its privacy impact. For example, assume that
because of a youthful indiscretion, an individual received a drug
conviction, for which she paid a penalty, or suppose that she had
engaged in political protests that create a risk of employer backlash.
Decades ago, she could have moved on with her life with confidence
that her prior conduct would not come back to haunt her, because the
information was not concatenated with other datasets or stored in
easily searchable fashion. Now, a conviction results in exclusion from
the economy because the information is permanently recorded and
spreads into background-check databases. Stale data damages
citizens’ ability to reinvent themselves; it increases the risk of identity
68
theft; it increases price discrimination; and, through filter bubbling
(the practice of limiting search results based on the searching party’s
69
data profile), it decreases the ability of citizens to make informed

66. See id.
67. See Schneier, supra note 33.
68. See ANNA BERNASEK & D.T. MONGAN, ALL YOU CAN PAY: HOW COMPANIES USE
OUR DATA TO EMPTY OUR WALLETS 17–20 (2015).
69. See generally ELI PARISER, THE FILTER BUBBLE: WHAT THE INTERNET IS HIDING
FROM YOU (2011) (detailing how technology firms influence citizens by limiting search
information to personalized results).
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choices drawn from a range of data sources, among a number of other
potential effects.
We take Schneier’s intuition one step further. We ask why
groups of people remain willing to continue pouring data into those
pools. One stock response, which we find unconvincing, is that people
70
do not care about privacy. The answer we advance here instead is
that groups and individuals have different incentives. This answer is
particularly elegant: public-goods theory explains why everyone
might deeply cherish privacy, yet still contribute to privacy-damaging
stores of data, just as everyone likes clean air, but individuals still
pollute.
The truth of Schneier’s suggestion has been repeatedly
demonstrated in the field. In 2006, AOL Inc. (AOL) released twenty
71
million search queries to researchers. Privacy organizations termed
this event a “data Valdez,” a reference to the oil spill caused by a run72
aground tanker off the Alaskan coast. Yet just as the original Valdez
spill now appears tiny compared to subsequent breaches such as the
British Petroleum spill, so subsequent data breaches have made
73
AOL’s search leak seem miniscule in comparison. The leaks have
grown in size and potential financial damage. Malware residing on
Home Depot cash registers captured the credit information of fifty-six
74
million card holders in September 2014. Another hack involved 160
million credit-card and debit-card numbers, stolen over a seven-year

70. See, e.g., Greg Satell, Let’s Face It, We Don’t Really Care About Privacy, FORBES
(Dec. 1, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/gregsatell/2014/12/01/lets-face-it-we-dont-reallycare-about-privacy [http://perma.cc/R27Y-6485] (characterizing a Pew survey indicating that 91
percent of Americans feel “that consumers have lost control over how personal information is
collected and used by companies” as evidence that although Americans are aware of personal
monitoring, they do not do enough to stop it).
71. Michael Barbaro & Tom Zeller, Jr., A Face is Exposed for AOL Searcher No. 4417749,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/09/technology/09aol.html?page
wanted=all [http://perma.cc/N4UB-X782].
72. See, e.g., Derek Slater, AOL’s Data Valdez Violates Users’ Privacy, ELEC. FRONTIER
FOUND. (Aug. 7, 2006), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2006/08/aols-data-valdez-violates-usersprivacy [http://perma.cc/5LE2-AVCF].
73. See, e.g., Brian Fung, The Target Hack Gets Worse: Phone Numbers, Addresses of Up to
70 Million Customers Leaked, WASH. POST: THE SWITCH (Jan. 10, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/01/10/the-target-hack-gets-worsephone-numbers-addresses-of-up-to-70-million-customers-leaked [http://perma.cc/6ER4-3XLA]
(documenting the data breach of Target, compromising the data of 70 million people).
74. See Jim Finkle & Nandita Bose, Home Depot Breach Bigger than Target at 56 Million
Cards, REUTERS (Sept. 18, 2014, 7:16 PM), http://www.reuters.com/ article/2014/09/18/us-homedepot-dataprotection-idUSKBN0HD2J420140918 [http://perma.cc/6FBX-PDWX].
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period. Hacks of tens of millions of cards from major retailers came
76
to light during the 2013 holiday season. These hacks were
augmented by the theft of non-credit-card private information
gathered from seventy million customers, including names, addresses,
77
email addresses, and phone numbers. The U.S. Office of Personnel
Management suffered a serious hack in which the personal data of
78
over twenty million people was compromised. Hacks are increasing
in frequency and impact because the pools of data stored by
79
companies continue to grow. Because more data can be
compromised in a single leak, hackers have a greater incentive to
instigate such a leak. As a result, merely accumulating data in
connection with regular e-commerce creates a toxic buildup of
incentives to steal and misuse that data.
Consumer-credit hacks are just the tip of the iceberg. Social
80
media provides rich troves for data researchers. Users disclose data
about shops they visit, trips they take, routes they drive, food they
81
eat, and increasingly people they encounter. Users tag photographs
82
of one another on Facebook. Users reference one another in
geolocated social-media posts. They comment on one another’s
75. Daniel Beekman, Hackers Hit Companies Like Nasdaq, 7-Eleven for $300 Million,
Prosecutors Say, NY DAILY NEWS (July 26, 2013, 12:41 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/
national/russians-ukrainian-charged-largest-hacking-spree-u-s-history-article-1.1408948 [http://
perma.cc/3GM5-Y88K].
76. See Gregory Wallace, Target and Neiman Marcus Hacks: The Latest, CNN MONEY
(Jan. 13, 2014, 12:35 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/01/13/news/target-neiman-marcus-hack
[http://perma.cc/LU8J-FQ2X].
77. See id.
78. See David Jackson & Kevin Johnson, China Suspected in Massive U.S. Government
Data Breach, USA TODAY (June 5, 2015, 12:42 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
nation/2015/06/04/obama-office-of-personnel-management-data-breach/28495775 [http://perma.
cc/H2DQ-MGSZ] (noting that the recent data theft from the Office of Personnel Management
computer systems compromised sensitive personal information, including Social Security
numbers, credit-card data, and other forms of financial information of roughly 21.5 million
people from both inside and outside the government).
79. See Martin Hilbert & Priscila López, The World’s Technological Capacity to Store,
Communicate, and Compute Information, 332 SCIENCE 60, 63–64 (2011) (detailing geometric
increase in worldwide data-storage capacity).
80. See Michael Birnhack, Reverse Engineering Informational Privacy Law, 15 YALE J.L. &
TECH. 24, 85 (2013) (“[N]ew network applications, especially social networks, enable (or
perhaps push) users to share personal data.”).
81. See id. at 86.
82. See James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1145–46 (2009)
(“There’s a photo-sharing feature, imaginatively names ‘Photos,’ with a clever tagging system:
click on a face in a photo—even one posted by someone else—and you can enter the person’s
name.”).
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walls. They take photographs of one another with Snapchat, and
84
post commented pictures to Instagram. Consumers do this in the
mistaken belief that data is ephemeral, or because of too-oftenbroken promises that consumer data can be kept safe from other
85
consumers or malicious third parties.
Ubiquitous smartphones permit users to contribute data about
86
themselves and others on a constant basis. People have fewer places
to hide from social-media-enabled computing because others carry it
87
with them. There are vanishingly few modern social situations in
which no one in the room is carrying a GPS-embedded or voiceactivated device. Engaging with social media is therefore not an
individual choice. It is an inevitable outcome of being in almost any
social situation. Location information is a particularly powerful
example of how one person’s data can affect others. Cell phones track
88
individuals’ location precisely, and by proxy, the locations of others.

83. See Jason Mazzone, Facebook’s Afterlife, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1643, 1653 (2012)
(“Facebook users do not necessarily want those responses and comments associated with their
own individual accounts, and therefore themselves, to be publicly accessible.”).
84. See Nick Bilton, Disruptions: Indiscreet Photos, Glimpsed Then Gone, N.Y. TIMES:
BITS (May 6, 2012, 5:24 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/06/disruptions-indiscreetphotos-glimpsed-then-gone [https://perma.cc/4NS8-9YGK]; Josh Constine, Instagram Now Lets
Anyone Tag You [Or Brands] In Photos, Adds Them To “Photos of You” Profile Section,
TECHCRUNCH (May 2, 2013), http://techcrunch.com/2013/05/02/instagram-photo-tagging [http://
perma.cc/7FR7-SLJE].
85. See Catherine Shu, Confirmed: Snapchat Hack Not A Hoax, 4.6M Usernames And
Numbers Published, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 31, 2013), http://techcrunch.com/2013/12/31/hackersclaim-to-publish-list-of-4-6m-snapchat-usernames-and-numbers [http://perma.cc/H3GR-59VH]
(noting that two data breaches at Snapchat “are both reminders that even in an ephemeral
messaging service, it would be a mistake to be lulled into a sense of security about the
information that you do have stored with the app”); see also Press Release, Federal Trade
Commission, Snapchat Settles FTC Charges That Promises of Disappearing Messages Were
False (May 18, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/05/snapchat-settlesftc-charges-promises-disappearing-messages-were [https://perma.cc/2FS4-TJDA].
86. See Thomas H. Chia, Fighting the Smartphone Patent War with Rand-Encumbered
Patents, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 209, 231 (2012) (discussing how smartphone operating
systems’ data collection can lead to increased probability of a monopoly).
87. See Peter Swire, Social Networks, Privacy, and Freedom of Association: Data Protection
vs. Data Empowerment, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1371, 1381–82 (2012) (noting that privacy is once again
a salient issue given, in part, both the “rise of social networks” and the “skyrocketing use of
mobile devices”).
88. See Lau, supra note 62, at 245 (noting the existence of “a new generation of social
networking built upon wireless platforms with Global Position System (GPS) technology”); see
also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-903, MOBILE DEVICE LOCATION DATA:
ADDITIONAL FEDERAL ACTIONS COULD HELP PROTECT CONSUMER PRIVACY 11–13 (2012)
(noting that “[s]ince the advent of consumer cellular technology, making and receiving mobile
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Knowledge of where one person is, augmented by knowledge of that
person’s social network, can help to identify and locate those who are
89
regularly in proximity to that person.
Users have accepted a far more invasive set of end-use license
conditions governing their use of smartphones than they have for
90
desktops and laptops. These smartphone contracts are understood
and construed as agreements purely between the consumer and the
carrier, operating-system designer, manufacturer, or application
provider. Data disclosed under these agreements impacts third parties
who have no say. Users’ contact lists and personal calendars are
91
regularly scraped by mobile applications. Users’ email conversations
92
with nonconsenting third parties are parsed by their email services.
Carriers hide keystroke-logging software on cell phones, and append
tracking IDs to outgoing connections, so that consumers are
93
comprehensively tracked without their knowledge. Browsing activity
can then be combined with geolocation and social-media mapping to

telephone calls has depended on the ability to determine a device’s location” and that new
location-tracking technologies have made it easier to track location).
89. See James Risen & Laura Poitras, NSA Gathers Data on Social Connections of U.S.
Citizens, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/29/us/nsa-examines-soc
ial-networks-of-us-citizens.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [http://perma.cc/B7SP-TS2F] (discussing
the National Security Agency’s use of social connections to track a target’s locations,
relationships, and other personal data).
90. See Lau, supra note 62, at 251–52 (“As a customer uses [Google’s G1 phone], data such
as the user’s name, contacts, instant messages, emails, calendars, social networking site visits,
and videos downloaded are all collected. The user cannot see what specific data is collected, and
there is no way to expunge the data.”).
91. See, e.g., Geoffrey A. Fowler, Secrets You Share Online Aren’t Always So Secret, WALL
ST. J. (Feb. 25, 2014, 7:54 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303880604579405
020639967010 [http://perma.cc/WQ3Z-PVBF] (describing secret-posting apps that “peddle
anonymity, [but] collect enough information to build profiles about each user,” for instance by
“tapping . . . location and contacts to share [postings] anonymously with [existing contacts]”).
92. See Eben Moglen, Address at Columbia Law School, Snowden and the Future: Part III;
The Union, May It Be Preserved (Nov. 13, 2013), http://snowdenandthefuture.info/snowdenand
thefuture-unionpreserved.pdf [http://perma.cc/3TEN-EUZL].
93. See Andrew D. Salek-Raham, Carrier IQ, Pre-Transit Keystroke Logging, and the
Federal Wiretap Act, 13 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 417, 426 (2012) (describing use of “embedded
handset software that automatically provides real-time data . . . without requiring user
participation or knowledge”); Robert McMillan, Verizon’s Perma-Cookie is a Privacy Killing
Machine, WIRED (Oct. 27, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/10/verizons-permacookie [http://perma.cc/T8PD-3DF6] (describing Verizon’s process of appending a UIDH to
customers’ web traffic).
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provide a total profile of the user, her social network, her real-world
94
location, and her interactions with others.
This concatenation of data is immensely valuable to advertisers
95
and has proven an irresistible temptation to government. One harm
stemming from toxic data is that citizens’ speech may be chilled due
96
to this hybrid corporate-government dragnet surveillance. Even
97
after the reforms of the USA Freedom Act, call data from most
telephone calls in the United States is gathered by carriers and stored
for access by the National Security Agency (NSA) under rolling
98
orders from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC).
Under current law, nothing prevents Internet service providers
(ISPs), mobile manufacturers, and the NSA from doing the same with
web-traffic or geolocation data (although now the NSA might now
99
not hold some data directly). The NSA denies such surveillance of
web queries and geolocation information, but recent revelations
demonstrate that it has the technology, has used or experimented
with such programs in the past, and has the go-ahead from the FISC,

94. See G.S. Hans, Privacy Policies, Terms of Service, and FTC Enforcement: Broadening
Unfairness Regulation for A New Era, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 163, 164 (2012)
(describing the routine collection and sale of user data collected by various websites).
95. See id. (describing the broad market for Internet user data among advertisers and other
third parties); Richards, supra note 14, at 1958 (“One of the most significant changes that the
age of surveillance has brought about is the increasing difficulty of separating surveillance by
governments from that of commercial entities. Public- and private-sector surveillance are
intertwined . . . [as] their digital fruits can easily cross the public/private divide.”).
96. See Scott Michelman, Who Can Sue over Government Surveillance?, 57 UCLA L. REV.
71, 78 (2009) (“People who believe that they are being surveilled might avoid . . . expressing
opinions that could subject them to further investigation.”).
97. See USA Freedom Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268 (restoring in modified
form several provisions of the Patriot Act, the Freedom Act imposes new limits on the bulk
collection of telecommunication metadata on U.S. citizens by American intelligence agencies,
including the National Security Agency).
98. See Timothy B. Lee, Everything You Need to Know About the NSA’s Phone Records
Scandal, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (June 6, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk
blog/wp/2013/06/06/everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-nsa-scandal [http://perma.cc/7G3JRQUJ] (“[T]he NSA is seeking [phone] records from everyone, even if they’ve never made an
international phone call.”).
99. See Emma Roller, This Is What Section 215 of the Patriot Act Does, SLATE: WEIGEL
(June 7, 2013), http://www.slate.com/blogs/weigel/2013/06/07/nsa_prism_scandal_what_patriot_
act_section_215_does.html [http://perma.cc/Q8QM-EBJW] (explaining that the NSA’s data
collection is authorized under Section 215 of the Patriot Act, and that the Section appears to
“appl[y] not only to phone metadata but also to email, chats, photos, video, logins, and other
online user data”).
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although the Second Circuit’s decision in ACLU v. Clapper may
101
give it pause as to the legality of this approach.
Aggregated data contributions serve to train machine learning
algorithms, such that the data offered by one person trains an
102
algorithm that impacts someone else.
For example, Future
Attribute Screening Technology (FAST) is a crime-prediction
program developed by the Department of Homeland Security. The
purpose of the program is to “rapidly identify suspicious behavior
indicators to provide real-time decision support to security and law
103
enforcement personnel.”
The program focuses on identifying
104
“malintent,” the present intent to commit future bad acts.
Volunteers are asked to perform disruptive acts, so that a machine
learning algorithm may study baseline data of malintent to associate
with behavioral indicators. The system focuses on a wide range of
factors, such as heart rate, body movement, movement of the eyes, or
pupil dilation, which might give away someone who is thinking of
committing a disruptive act. The volunteers’ donation of information
about themselves teaches the algorithms about others and, when the
program is active, may result in the arrest and detention of people

100. ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015).
101. See Charlie Savage, In Test Project, NSA Tracked Cellphone Locations, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 3, 2013, at A13 (suggesting that “any long-term, automated collection of a person’s publicly
displayed actions might raise Fourth Amendment issues”); see also Gregory Ferenstein, NSA
Uses Facebook and GPS Data to Identify Suspects in Networks of Americans, TECHCRUNCH
(Sept. 28, 2013), http://techcrunch.com/2013/09/28/nsa-uses-facebook-and-gps-data-to-identifysuspects-in-networks-of-americans [http://perma.cc/R7HA-LWSB] (describing a comprehensive
GPS tracking program ostensibly targeted at non-U.S. persons); Glenn Greenwald, XKeyscore:
NSA Tool Collects ‘Nearly Everything a User Does on the Internet’, THE GUARDIAN (July 31,
2013, 8:56 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-onlinedata [http://perma.cc/CT6Y-N3N9] (stating that “NSA analysts have exceeded even legal limits
as interpreted by the NSA in domestic surveillance”). For the legal underpinnings of these
metadata-collection programs, see In re FBI for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible
Things from [redacted], No. BR 13-109, 2013 WL 5741573, at *1 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013);
Opinion and Order, [redacted], No. PR/TT [redacted] (FISA Ct. [redacted]), http://dni.gov/files/
documents/1118/CLEANEDPRTT%201.pdf [http://perma.cc/HTX7-GXGH]. But see Clapper,
785 F.3d at 826 (reversing and remanding the district court’s determination that Section 215 of
the Patriot Act authorized bulk telephony-metadata collection by the NSA).
102. See MacCarthy, supra note 1, at 445 (“Privacy externalities are composite. . . . The first
step in understanding negative privacy externalities is to understand how data collectors,
aggregators, and analysts can infer information about individuals . . . .”).
103. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE FUTURE
ATTRIBUTE SCREENING TECHNOLOGY (FAST) PROJECT 2 (2008), https://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_st_fast.pdf [https://perma.cc/D3E4-6PNC].
104. See id.
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based on their supposed malintent. That is, the generosity of
volunteers with respect to their personal data creates a system that
almost exclusively impacts others.
C. Privacy’s Individualism Bias
While the reality of data sharing and parsing has changed,
privacy theory has lagged. Privacy theorists differ famously and
106
widely on the proper conception of privacy, but these many theories
tend to share an underlying theoretical assumption. Most dominant
107
theories of privacy view it through the lens of individualism. These
108
theories may touch on the social dimension of privacy, but they do
109
not strongly engage the social dilemma of privacy.
1. Individualism’s Historical Influence. To show the deep roots
of individualism’s hold on privacy discourse, we draw on foundational
110
111
examples. Consider The Right to Privacy, the seminal U.S. work
on legal protection of privacy by attorney Samuel Warren and future
105. See generally Margaret Hu, Big Data Blacklisting, 67 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming Sept.
2015) (arguing that the government’s overreliance on big data and metadata may deprive
citizens of their due process rights).
106. See Solove, Privacy, supra note 64, at 1099–1123 (gathering and challenging essentialist
conceptions of privacy).
107. See REGAN, supra note 38, at 3; Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy:
Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957, 958 (1989) (“[P]rivacy
rests upon an individualist concept of society.”).
108. See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609,
1664 (1999) [hereinafter Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy] (“As Post observes, information
privacy is not ‘a value asserted by individuals against the demands of a curious and intrusive
society,’ but a necessary aspect of relations with others.”); see also Post, supra note 107, at 962–
63 (noting that “each ‘individual must rely on others to complete the picture of him of which he
himself is allowed to paint only certain parts’”).
109. We are not the first to note the zeroing in on individualism. As Priscilla Regan writes,
“[I]n policy debates in the United States, the emphasis has been on achieving the goal of
protecting the privacy of individuals rather than curtailing the surveillance activities of
organizations. . . . It was thought that by protecting individual privacy, the surveillance activities
of organizations and the government would be checked.” REGAN, supra note 38, at 3. Thus,
“[a]lthough privacy is viewed as a boundary separating the individual from society, the
dominant assumption has been that only the individual has an interest in that boundary.” Id. at
23. The result has been an emphasis on an atomistic individual and the legal protection of his or
her rights. Id. at 214. The results have not been positive for privacy theory: “[I]ndividualistic
conception of privacy does not provide a fruitful basis for the formulation of policy to protect
privacy.” Id. at 4.
110. For a more extensive treatment of the history of individualism in privacy theory, see id.
at 24–41.
111. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
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Justice Louis Brandeis. The article explores the relationship between
changing social mores and developing technology. Warren and
Brandeis discuss the increased intrusiveness of technology and the
media. Photography and newspapers served as the catalyst for the
crystallization of privacy rights out of the common law. Warren and
Brandeis’s approach has proven both technologically and legally
prescient. For example, they wrote that “[i]nstantaneous photographs
and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of
private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten
to make good the prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall
112
be proclaimed from the house-tops.’” The same could have been
written about Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, or Snapchat.
Yet even Warren and Brandeis’s visionary approach relied on
private rights defended by individuals. Warren and Brandeis’ “right
to be let alone” is an individual right, not a tool that helps groups
navigate a social dilemma. For example, they wrote that “[r]ecent
inventions and business methods call attention to the next step which
must be taken for the protection of the person, and for securing to the
113
individual . . . the right ‘to be let alone.’” They considered their
“purpose to consider whether the existing law affords a principle
which can properly be invoked to protect the privacy of the
individual; and, if it does, what the nature and extent of such
114
protection is.” Once noted, the focus on individualism is found
throughout: “The common law secures to each individual the right of
determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and
115
emotions shall be communicated to others,” they noted, concluding
that “[i]n every such case the individual is entitled to decide whether
that which is his shall be given to the public. No other has the right to
116
publish his productions in any form, without his consent.”
The traditional right to privacy as formatively expressed by
Warren and Brandeis contemplates an individual’s control of
information that originates from or bears on that individual and is
therefore hers exclusively to reveal or protect. It does not focus on
the spillover effects of information that is not just about me, or you,
but us. The traditional approach does not focus on group

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 195.
Id.
Id. at 197.
Id. at 198.
Id. at 199.
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coordination as the problem, or on known solutions to the social
dilemma. Overlaps exist, of course. Perhaps were Warren and
Brandeis to write today, they might pen a new Right to Privacy, which
would note that person A’s disclosure of seemingly innocuous
information could be aggregated by computers, stored in functionally
infinite databases, and then used to train machine learning algorithms
that may negatively affect B and everyone else. But to do so requires
a further development of the theoretical underpinnings of privacy to
shed light on how certain information is not the individual’s private
and exclusive domain, but rather bears on everyone.
2. Individualism in Modern Notice and Choice. Modern privacy
approaches have developed and intensified the emphasis on
117
individual notice, choice, and control over information flows. For
example, privacy as control has emerged as a dominant theory of
118
informational privacy, in part because it promises individuals
(rightly or wrongly) the ability to both disclose and control
119
dissemination of information online.
Although privacy as control is not an incurably individualcentered approach because the tools of control could be handed to
120
groups, the theory’s subsequent development and, above all, its
operationalizing regime of notice and choice demonstrate the

117. See REGAN, supra note 38, at 24–41 (tracing the post–Right to Privacy history of
overemphasis on individualism through legal and philosophical thought).
118. See THOMAS NAGEL, CONCEALMENT AND EXPOSURE 4 (2002); JEFFREY ROSEN, THE
UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 5 (2000); ALAN F. WESTIN,
PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967) (defining privacy as “the claim of individuals, groups, or
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them
is communicated to others”); Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 482 (1968) (“Privacy is
not simply an absence of information about us in the minds of others; rather it is the control we
have over information about ourselves.”); James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of
Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1167 (2004) (“The idea that privacy is
really about the control of one’s public image has long appealed to the most philosophically
sophisticated American commentators, from Alan Westin, to Charles Fried, to Jeffrey Rosen, to
Thomas Nagel.”) (citations omitted); see also Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State,
32 CONN. L. REV. 815, 820 (2000) [hereinafter Schwartz, Internet Privacy] (“The weight of the
consensus about the centrality of privacy-control is staggering.”).
119. See MacCarthy, supra note 1, at 434 (“The informed consent model is entirely focused
on the individual.”).
120. See WESTIN, supra note 118, at 7 (“[P]rivacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them
is communicated to others.”).
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dominance of individualism in modern privacy law. Notice and
choice depend entirely and explicitly on individuals. Such regimes
attempt to ensure that individuals know what is being done with their
information, and have some choice as to how or whether that data is
used. Notice is provided to the individual about information
pertaining to the individual, and the choice is the individual’s to
make.
Even critiques of notice and choice tend to buy into the
individual paradigm, rather than challenging the baseline assumption
of individuality. The traditional response to the flaws of notice-andchoice regimes has been that the notice and choice are not yet robust
122
enough. The standard criticism is that consumers are not sufficiently
informed about what is being done with their information, and they
have not been given enough discretion in controlling their privacy. A
standard solution is to argue that the quality of the notice and choice
must improve. To achieve this, terms of use and end-user license
agreements are made ever-more explicit at the direction of courts and
regulators. The focus on comprehension and control supposedly
enables the consumer to understand the consequences of her
revelation of information about herself and control the information
123
she offers about herself. In turn, the privacy-by-design regulatory
trend is intended to incentivize companies to build tools that
124
empower individual understanding and control.
This is not to say that notice and choice are not useful, merely
that individual-focused education and empowerment appear to yield
125
diminishing returns. Consumers quite rationally do not read the

121. See REGAN, supra note 38, at 27 (“[I]n two important areas Westin’s analysis moves
away from further development of that social importance of privacy: the first involves his
discussion of the importance of privacy to the individual and the second his analysis of the
balance between privacy and other interests.”).
122. See, e.g., Jeff Sovern, Opting in, Opting out, or No Options at All: The Fight for Control
of Personal Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033, 1094 (1999) (noting that consumers are not
currently well informed and “often find it difficult to opt out”).
123. See Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 32, at 301–02 (“Thus, the appropriate privacyprotective behavior entails ‘mak[ing] secondary uses of information only with clear, unequivocal
user consent and control, and test[ing] these controls to ensure that the default settings match
with the expectations of the user.’”).
124. ANN CAVOUKIAN, INFO. & PRIVACY COMM’R OF ONTARIO, PRIVACY BY DESIGN:
THE 7 FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES 1–2 (Jan. 2011), http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/7
foundationalprinciples.pdf [http://perma.cc/WY97-SSAA].
125. See Solove, Introduction, supra note 61, at 1881 (“[E]ven well-informed and rational
individuals cannot appropriately self-manage their privacy due to several structural problems.”).

FAIRFIELD AND ENGEL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

11/20/2015 3:26 PM

410

[Vol. 65:385

DUKE LAW JOURNAL
126

carefully redrafted privacy policies. Even if they did, the controls
produced by companies in response to privacy-by-design incentives
are often left unused because of time costs of vigilance or
127
complexity.
Privacy by design has delivered strong back-end
protection for consumers’ personal information that corporations
deem proprietary, but it has not delivered strong front-end protection
128
for information as consumers disclose it.
Even if individualized notice and choice did function as
desired—and it does not—there would still be a problem. The noticeand-choice approach to privacy assumes incorrectly that the
individual is the predominant unit in the privacy conversation, and
thus that each individual can and should manage information solely
129
130
about herself. This is an oversight. By consenting to information
gathering, a user becomes a conduit for gathering information about
131
her entire social network, whether or not they have consented.

126. See Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read
the Fine Print? Testing a Law and Economics Approach to Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (2014); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Does Contract Disclosure Matter?, 168 J.
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 94, 94 (2012); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Does
Increased Disclosure Help? Evaluating the Recommendations of the ALI’s ‘Principles of the Law
of Software Contracts’, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 165, 173 (2011); Solove, Introduction, supra note 61,
at 1884 (“Most people do not read privacy notices on a regular basis.”); Daniel J. Solove &
Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583,
667 (2014) (“Social science research reveals that consumers do not read or understand privacy
policies, are heavily influenced by the way choices are framed, and harbor many preexisting
assumptions that are incorrect. . . . [A]ccording to one study . . . 75% falsely believe that when ‘a
website has a privacy policy, it means the site will not share my information with other websites
and companies.’”).
127. See Emil Protalinski, Survey: Facebook, Google Privacy Policies Are Incomprehensible,
ZDNET (May 4, 2012), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/facebook/survey-facebook-google-privacypolicies-are-incomprehensible/12420 [http://perma.cc/G542-FF8F] (discussing the fact that
“consumers [have] a very poor understanding of how Facebook and Google track and store user
information”).
128. See Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, Obscurity by Design, 88 WASH. L. REV.
385, 418 (2013) (noting the failure of current online privacy solutions to “tackle the ‘front-end’
of [the problem]”).
129. See, e.g., Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 32, at 247 (“Scholars and advocates
criticize [U.S. privacy policy] as weak, incomplete, and confusing, and argue that it fails to
empower individuals to control the use of their personal information.”).
130. See MacCarthy, supra note 1, at 444 (“I want to draw attention to and emphasize
another way in which informed consent does not legitimize the use of information. These are
contexts that exhibit substantial privacy externalities.”).
131. See Michal Kosinski, David Stillwell & Thore Graepel, Private Traits and Attributes are
Predictable from Digital Records of Human Behavior, 110 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 5802,
5802–05 (2013) (describing their study in which users’ personal attributes were predicted with
high rates of accuracy based on their Facebook likes); Solove, Privacy, supra note 64, at 1104
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Even if regulators were to succeed in making individualized
consent to data gathering meaningful, the intervention would miss the
essential point. Educated and empowered consumers would still have
little say, because even if perfectly informed and empowered, they
only control their own data, and cannot influence the sea of
132
information from which big data algorithms work. The old canard
that if an individual does not like a social network, she need not use it
133
misses a critical point. Because so much information is provided by
134
third parties, no one can truly opt out. If a person is not on the
network herself, she can opt out of its individual benefit, but still bear
(most of) its individual cost.
The very notion of individual control or individual-centered
notice and choice complicates group efforts to maintain coordination
in the face of a social dilemma. To demonstrate the problem, we offer
a thought experiment, which we term the “informed prisoner’s
dilemma.” Consider a standard prisoner’s dilemma. If both prisoners
stay mum, they both get a mild punishment of one year in jail. If both
prisoners sell each other out, they each get five years. If one prisoner
stays quiet while the other squeals, then the one who stays quiet gets
ten years in prison, and the rat gets none. Individually, each prisoner
135
will always want to squeal. No matter what the other prisoner does,
a prisoner who squeals is better off. But the socially maximized
outcome (for the prisoners, of course) is for them to cooperate. If we
(“[P]ersonal information rarely belongs to just one individual; it is often formed in relationships
with others.”); Jennifer Golbeck, Smart People Prefer Curly Fries, SLATE (Oct. 7, 2014, 7:48
AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2014/10/youarewhatyoulike_find_
out_what_algorithms_can_tell_about_you_based_on_your.html [http://perma.cc/9VSZ-SD7W]
(“[T]he most important lesson to take away from these algorithms is that you cannot control
what is predicted.”).
132. But see MacCarthy, supra note 1, at 446 (“An information externality occurs when one
person’s revelation of information reveals something about someone else.”).
133. See Solove, Introduction, supra note 61, at 1881 (“Privacy . . . fosters a certain kind of
society, since people’s decisions about their own privacy affect society, not just themselves.
Because individual decisions to consent to data collection, use, or disclosure might not
collectively yield the most desirable social outcome, privacy self-management often fails to
address these larger social values.”).
134. For example, Facebook maintains a “shadow social network” of information about
users who do not use Facebook—populated by information provided by users who do. Violet
Blue, Firm: Facebook ‘Bug’ Worse Than Reported; Non-Users Affected Too, ZDNET (June 26,
2013, 6:05 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/firm-facebook-bug-worse-than-reported-non-users-alsoaffected-7000017318 [http://perma.cc/ARF2-M8K6].
135. See, e.g., Kreps et al., supra note 48, at 246 (explaining how the Nash Equilibrium path
of a prisoner’s dilemma game results in an incentive structure in which each prisoner will always
want to defect).
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consider the prisoners as a group, then cooperating prisoners will
suffer only two years’ worth of penalty instead of the ten that they
collectively would suffer if either or both squeal. Neoclassical
economics therefore predicts that both parties will reach the socially
suboptimal decision to squeal.
Yet conceivably the prisoners, being experienced at this sort of
thing, may at first choose not to rat one another out. One way to stop
this welfare-maximizing cooperation is to inform and empower the
individual participants as to the nature and likely outcomes of the
social dilemma. Imagine taking one prisoner out of the room, sitting
her down, and informing her at great length about the nature of the
dilemma, including the fact that she is better off defecting no matter
what the other prisoner does. Consider the effect of empowering the
prisoner’s decision, so that she is certain her decision to defect will be
honored and will with certainty have the described effect. Providing
the ordinary prisoner with that mental model might change how she
sees the situation and might, thereby, make the dilemma worse. In
short, if privacy is a social dilemma, the very education and
empowerment that regulators rely on to ameliorate the dilemma may
instead exacerbate it.
3. Individualism in the Transatlantic Privacy Discourse. The
individualism bias also crosses major cultural and legal divides in
privacy law. For example, approaches to privacy appear at first blush
136
to play out differently on each side of the Atlantic. One narrative is
137
that the United States focuses on liberty, while the European Union
138
focuses on human dignity. Yet both philosophies look at privacy as
139
a matter best resolved by informing and empowering individuals. In
both Europe and the United States, the presumed goal is for fully

136. See Whitman, supra note 118, at 1160 (explaining how the United States and Europe do
not possess “general ‘human’ intuitions about the ‘horror of privacy violations,’ but instead have
different institutions that shape privacy protection norms”).
137. See id. at 1158 (arguing that the American notion of “privacy” is strongly connected to
the idea of “liberty” by example of constitutional-rights cases argued on basis of the right to
privacy).
138. Id. at 1161 (“Continental privacy protections are, at their core, a form of protection of a
right to respect and personal dignity.”).
139. As a matter of private law, the functional difference is in the ability to consent to
corporate data gathering. In Europe, and speaking extremely broadly, consent to corporate data
tracking is opt-in. In the United States, consent is opt-out. See Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky,
To Track or “Do Not Track”: Advancing Transparency and Individual Control in Online
Behavioral Advertising, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 281, 287 (2012).
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informed individuals to consent to the use of their individual data.
The problem remains: the data does not impact that individual alone.
The Atlantic divide in privacy theory therefore cloaks an
140
underlying similarity. In both legal orders, individuals consent to the
141
use of data that impacts nonconsenting third parties. Both the
liberty and dignity approaches focus on empowering and informing
142
individuals, rather than improving group coordination. U.S. and
European law differ on whether individuals must opt in or opt out of
data collection and processing. They differ on the scope and timing of
the individual’s consent. They differ on the powers an individual may
wield—whether an individual may demand that Google delete stale
143
information pertaining to her, for instance. But both traditions
locate the problem and its solution with the individual deciding in
144
isolation—the individual must opt in or opt out. The individual must
consent to out-of-context uses. The individual must pursue deletion of
data that pertains to her. In both the United States and Europe, the
law provides tools to help individuals understand and control
information that directly concerns them. Both traditions lack tools
that help groups of individuals manage coordination problems. And
both traditions have little to no protection for spillover effects of
information—information about person A that nevertheless imposes
145
negative effects on person B, and everyone else.
The above discussion attempts to point out the serious bias in
favor of conceptualizing privacy in terms of individual information,
rights, and actions. This bias was present in the foundational
conceptions of a legal right to privacy, and lives on today as an
140. See Whitman, supra note 118, at 1163 (explaining how the differences between the two
theories are relative, but not absolute).
141. See Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 139, at 285 (analogizing that placing the burden of
consent on users is “tantamount to imposing the burden of healthcare decisions on patients
instead of doctors,” due to the complexity of the online-information ecosystem).
142. See Whitman, supra note 118, at 1167–68 (explaining how the European conception of
privacy, the “right to a public image of our own making,” comes from the same root as its
American counterpart, “the right to control our public face”).
143. See, e.g., Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos
(May 13, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=152065&doc
lang=EN [http://perma.cc/ED5L-DZRK] (holding that Google must delete stale personal data).
144. See Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the
Age of Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239, 260–62 (2013) (arguing that “[t]he
consent model is flawed from an economic perspective”).
145. See Lau, supra note 62, at 266 (“If a citizen wishes to be left alone on the Internet, and
takes no steps to be on the Internet, the law does not provide any meaningful remedy for when
a third party publishes information about that citizen on the Internet.”).
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underlying assumption in the modern operationalization of privacy as
control through notice-and-choice regimes. Further, a comparison of
the U.S. and E.U. approaches shows that for all their differences,
approaches to privacy in the United States and Europe both focus on
individualism—one philosophy is informed by individual dignity, and
the other by individual liberty. As a result, the social dilemma of
privacy has gone underexamined in legal theory, as the following
Subpart will discuss.
D. Conceptions of the Public Good in Privacy Theory
We discuss here three broad types of legal analysis of the social
dimension of privacy. First, theorists often address the social
146
dimension of privacy by generalizing from the individual case. For
example, Alan Westin described privacy as the individual withdrawal
147
from society. Under this approach, social privacy is valued primarily
148
Social welfare is a
because it guarantees individual privacy.
fortuitous byproduct of happy individuals. A second set of analyses
treats privacy as a threat to the public good, usually defined as some
149
sort of interest in preserving security against criminals or terrorists.
Finally, there is a nascent literature touching on privacy as a public
150
good, often through the lens of environmental regulation. We touch
on each in turn. We note in conclusion that there is no treatment of
privacy as a public good that examines the public-goods literature for
tools to empower groups to resist privacy’s social dilemma.
1. Privacy in the Public Good. The first grouping of legal
analysis asserts that privacy is in “the public good.” This can be
difficult to distinguish from claims that privacy is “a public good.”
These terms belong to different disciplines. When a lawyer discusses
“the public good,” and an economist explores “a public good,” they
are likely talking about two quite different things. The public good
refers to what is good for the public. A public good refers to a good, a
product, which is produced by groups under certain conditions that

146. See, e.g., REGAN, supra note 38, at 27–28 (discussing Alan Westin’s turn from social to
individual accounts of the value of privacy, and offering a critique of the resulting
overindividualization of Westin’s theories).
147. See id. at 28.
148. See id.; see also infra Part I.D.1.
149. See infra Part I.D.2.
150. See infra Part I.D.3.
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create a tension between selfishness and cooperation. The public
good is a general assertion that the public will be better off if x or y
state is the case. A public good is a product, good, service, or other
benefit that may not be produced, because everyone can share
equally in it, whether they contribute to it or not. The public good
does not necessarily suffer from a free-rider problem. A public good
152
is defined by a free-rider problem. Actions taken to promote the
public good are not necessarily social dilemmas. A public good
153
necessarily involves a social dilemma. If one defines the public good
as welfare, normally the public good increases if a public good is
provided. Yet welfare is a broader concept, and one need not define
the public good in terms of welfare theory. But it is also quite clear
that not everything that is in the public good is necessarily a public
154
good.
Much legal scholarship begins with the premise that individual
privacy is good, and that because it is good, protecting privacy is
155
socially beneficial, or in the public good. The problem is that the
similarity in surface terminology, combined with the vague use of
economic language, means that many legal analyses are confusing as
to whether they truly address a public good. An assertion that privacy
is a public good may mean simply that the author believes privacy is
156
good, and will benefit the public. The assertion that something is
good for each citizen individually does not mean that it is good for
151. See Ledyard, supra note 10, at 111–13.
152. See id. at 112 (“There are many theories [regarding what happens in public goods
experiments]. One, the economic/game-theoretic prediction, is that no one will ever contribute
anything. Each potential contributor will try to ‘free ride’ on the others.”).
153. See id. (explaining that “the group would be best off . . . (taking home $10 each) if all
contributed $5. . . . From the point of view of this theory, individual self-interest is at odds with
group interest”).
154. Actually, “a public good” can well be at variance with “the public good.” The classic
illustration is a cartel. For each cartel member, it is individually best if all other cartel members
sell at a high price, while she undercuts and attracts all trade. Hence from the perspective of the
cartel members, cartel discipline is a public good. Yet antitrust authorities intervene whenever
they spot a cartel because, for the demand side of the market, and for welfare, price fixing is
undesirable.
155. See REGAN, supra note 38, at 27–29 (surveying the literature).
156. See, e.g., Joshua S. Levy, Towards a Brighter Fourth Amendment: Privacy and
Technological Change, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 502, 511 (2011) (“[U]nlike the rights of an individual
criminal suspect, [privacy] is a public good.”). Levy does define public goods carefully, and it is
clear he is on the right track, but his distinction does not stand: the individual rights of
defendants ought to be, to his analysis, the same good as privacy because it benefits us all when
criminal defendants have rights. This public good is different from a true public good, a
common good to which all share undivided nonexclusive access.
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society as a whole—that is precisely the nature of a social dilemma.
So assertions that privacy is an individual right which, when enjoyed
by society as a whole, is beneficial, do not capture the tension at the
heart of public goods.
2. Privacy Against the Public Good. Especially in political
discourse, privacy is sometimes portrayed as standing in tension with
the public’s interest in security, that is, that privacy is against the
157
public good. The argument is simple and seductive. Bad people
desire privacy to hide their bad acts. What a criminal seeks to keep
private, the public wants to know. Thus, as Judge Richard Posner
noted, “[m]uch of what passes for the name of privacy is really just
trying to conceal the disreputable parts of your conduct . . . . Privacy
is mainly about trying to improve your social and business
opportunities by concealing the sorts of bad activities that would
158
cause other people not to want to deal with you.” To this way of
thinking, privacy interests stand in tension with community interests,
and must therefore be curtailed in the name of the public good. This
tension between individual privacy and public need to know
particularly influences modern discussions of the reach and role of the
159
surveillance state. We address this approach because it asserts a
relationship between privacy and the public good, albeit one with
160
which we and others strongly disagree.
The argument starts from a false point of departure, assigning
negative value to all information that anyone may wish to keep
157. See Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1410 (1974)
(“Governments . . . frequently confront ‘private rights’ with the ‘public good,’ implying tension
between them that requires choice or accommodation.”).
158. Grant Goss, Judge: Give NSA Unlimited Access to Digital Data, PC WORLD (Dec. 4,
2014, 1:46 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2855776/judge-give-nsa-unlimited-access-todigital-data.html [http://perma.cc/649V-9WTR]; see also Richard Posner, The Right of Privacy,
12 GA. L. REV. 393, 394–401 (1978) (explaining the concept of information concealment in
greater depth).
159. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & David Gray, Addressing the Harm of Total
Surveillance: A Reply to Professor Neil Richards, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 262, 272 (2013) (“[A]ny
account of surveillance’s privacy harms is often resisted on the grounds that some surveillance is
essential for the public good. But there is a line between surveillance that is essential for the
public good and invasive total-information awareness technologies, and that line is easy to cross
if unattended.”).
160. See, e.g., Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman’s” Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust
Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1809 (1994) (“The pressing needs
of an immediate crisis almost always will seem to justify a government intrusion . . . . Looked at
in isolation, it is better to have the shoreline of one’s island of privacy partially eroded by
government surveillance than to have the entire island overrun by barbarians.”).
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private. Thus, for example, Posner does not wish a person to hide
161
from a future potential spouse that he is sterile. By selecting
harmful characteristics, Posner tautologically ensures that hiding the
characteristic will cause harm. But this dynamic does not hold for the
vast majority of private information. It is certainly untrue of
democratic activists in totalitarian countries, people with high
potentiality but no certainty of rare genetic disorders, persecuted
religious or racial minorities, individuals with a minority sexual
orientation, or with any of a raft of other traits. Keeping those traits
hidden has no possible bearing on the economic decisions Posner
supports, except that counterparties or the government may misuse
162
the information. Posner suggests rationality will trump prejudice,
but numerous examples, from employment discrimination to religious
persecution, put paid to that notion. Even more important: Ex-post
comparison of the benefit (for a third party) and the harm (for the
person whose private information is at stake) misses the point. The
normatively appropriate comparison is ex ante. It must balance all
benefits and all harms from making the piece of information in
question accessible.
In its most recent security-focused incarnation, the argument that
privacy cuts against the public good falls short because it both creates
a false dichotomy between privacy and security, and does not
163
adequately account for harms created by mass surveillance.
Treating privacy as a security threat trades fear of terrorists for fear
of one’s own government. Or, to cast things in the language of public
goods, security is likely also a public good, with its own production
function and its own problems of free riders or exploiters. But that
does not settle the role of privacy within that production function.
The question is whether one treats privacy-seeking behavior as
creating an entirely private benefit outweighed by the social costs it
creates for the group, or whether one treats privacy as part of the
stock of social welfare, such that reducing privacy reduces social

161. See Posner, supra note 158, at 399 (“Other private information that people wish to
conceal, while not strictly discreditable, would if revealed correct misapprehensions that the
individual is trying to exploit, as when a worker conceals a serious health problem from his
employer or a prospective husband conceals his sterility from his fiancée.”).
162. See Posner, supra note 11, at 406.
163. See generally DANIEL SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN
PRIVACY AND SECURITY (2011) (arguing that many security-based arguments posit a false
trade-off between privacy and security, and that surveillance imposes serious costs even on
those who believe they have nothing to hide and therefore nothing to fear from surveillance).
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welfare. We view a secure private life as an integral part of security,
not a threat to it.
Separately, there may well be opportunity costs between public
goods, but it is not our aim to settle the debate as to which projects
the public should choose. Nor is it useful to pit public goods against
one another in pairwise comparisons. Why should we pit security
versus privacy, and not against public education, or clean air, or any
of millions of other public goods, or against the sum of all of those?
We admit that there are myriad different public goods. The existence
of many public goods does not reduce the need to examine each, and
to maximize social welfare from investment in that good. Thus, while
there may be opportunity costs between public goods in general, and
even between security and privacy in particular, we maintain that
exploring how to maximize the social value of privacy is valuable
regardless of any trade-off effects between privacy and security.
3. Toward Privacy as a Public Good. The legal literature is not
entirely devoid of the suggestion that privacy can be profitably
164
studied as a true public good. For example, Paul Schwartz notes that
“information privacy functions as a type of public good, like clean air
165
or national defense” and that “[p]rivacy, from a constitutive
perspective, is also a ‘public good.’ Information privacy is a kind of
commons that requires some degree of social control to construct and
166
then preserve.” Priscilla Regan discusses the “collective value” of
privacy, which she “derive[s] from the economists’ concept of
167
collective or public goods.” Regan suggests that “[r]ecognition that
privacy has some features of a public or collective good would make
clearer the institutional or organizational interests in personal
information and the weaknesses of a market solution in providing

164. See, e.g., Edward J. Janger & Paul M. Schwartz, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,
Information Privacy, and the Limits of Default Rules, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1253–54 (2002);
Schwartz, Internet Privacy, supra note 118, at 832–33; Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy, supra
note 108, at 1698; Schwartz, Property, supra note 30, at 2084–85 (“[I]nformation privacy
functions as a type of public good, like clean air or national defense.”); Paul M. Schwartz,
Regulating Governmental Data Mining in the United States and Germany: Constitutional Courts,
the State, and New Technology, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 351, 367–68 (2011).
165. Schwartz, Property, supra note 30, at 2084–85.
166. Janger & Schwartz, supra note 164, at 1253–54.
167. REGAN, supra note 38, at 227.
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privacy protection.” We take this suggestion as an invitation for a
full analysis of privacy in light of what the public-goods literature of
169
the past several decades has learned.
We further note a nascent literature that draws on existing
environmental regulatory approaches to propose solutions to the
170
problem of toxic data. The eco-privacy literature shares a base set
of concerns with our public-goods analysis. For example, Dennis
171
Hirsch analogizes spam to pollution, suggesting that privacy (in this
172
sense, freedom from spam) is subject to a tragedy of the commons.
Michael Froomkin uses a similar characterization: “Many mass datacollection activities, particularly those that take place in or through
public spaces can be usefully analogized to pollution of the private
173
sphere.” Eben Moglen notes that “[surveillance] is not the first, the
last, or the most serious of the various forms of environmental crisis
174
brought on in the last two centuries by industrial overreaching.”
There are therefore some similarities between our approach and the
175
framing language of the environmental-privacy literature. That
literature has the particular advantage of drawing on a rich and
successful regulatory tradition, which has ironed some of the kinks
out of helping industrial communities find and implement low-cost,
high-value changes. As such, it provides a strong set of analogies for

168. See id. at 231; see also MacCarthy, supra note 1, at 447 (“When privacy is thought about
as involving an externality, it is inherently social because privacy decisions made by some actors
inevitably affect the economic interests of others.”).
169. See Schwartz, Property, supra note 30, at 2076 (“This Part examines and re-evaluates
the skepticism regarding property rights in personal data; the following Part develops a model
for propertization of personal data that accommodates these concerns.”); see also id. at 2085
(“The traditional problem with relying on a property regime to supply a public good follows
from two of the good’s qualities—nonrivalrous consumption and nonexcludability. A privacy
commons illustrates both of these aspects of public goods.”).
170. See A. Michael Froomkin, Regulating Mass Surveillance as Privacy Pollution: Learning
from Environmental Impact Statements, 2015 ILL. L. REV. 1713; Hirsch, Inner Environment,
supra note 26, at 10; Dennis D. Hirsch, The Glass House Effect: Big Data, the New Oil, and the
Power of Analogy, 66 MAINE L. REV. 374, 375 (2014) [hereinafter Hirsch, Glass House Effect];
Moglen, supra note 92.
171. Hirsch, Inner Environment, supra note 26, at 15–18.
172. Id. at 24–28.
173. Froomkin, supra note 170 (manuscript at 30).
174. Moglen, supra note 92.
175. See Hirsch, Glass House Effect, supra note 170 (“If data is the new oil, then these data
releases are the new oil spills.”); see also Hirsch, Inner Environment, supra note 26, at 28
(“When a web site gathers and sells personal information about one of its users, . . . they cause
that individual to lose a degree of privacy. This cost is borne by the user and is external to the
business. It is a negative externality.”).
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how to craft and maintain political coalitions to resolve particularly
harmful collective-action problems.
Yet our approach involves some important differences. Whereas
the environmental-privacy literature draws on environmental law and
the history of environmental regulation for inspiration, we draw on
public-goods models and experiments, and hence focus on the
behavioral dimension of the question. Environmental law is chiefly
shaped by the experience of government in seeking to rein in large176
scale polluters. As a result, the environmental-privacy literature
suggests government action or legislation to resolve the collective177
action problem of privacy. Whereas the example of environmental
law suggests regulation to resolve collective-action problems, we
suggest group tools to sustain cooperation with minimal outside
intervention.
The eco-privacy literature brings a fresh and welcome
perspective, as well as a history of experience with practical
implementation, especially for regulating high-volume polluters. Not
all collective-action problems are the same, however. In considering
that privacy may be a public good, we focus less on large-scale
offenders who are most analogous to the factories of environmentallaw analysis, and more on the small but constant contributions that
users make exposing data about one another, the prisoners in a
prisoners’ dilemma. Both approaches are needed. Broad privacy
legislation may be necessary to restrain mass consumer surveillance,
and environmental law may offer a good place to start. On the other
hand, broad privacy legislation has proven hard to pass, despite the
broad base of popularity among the electorate for enhanced privacy.
Whether or not such efforts succeed in the current political climate,
another path remains open.
This is where our approach parts ways (amicably) with the
environmental-privacy literature. Instead of following a Pigouvian
approach of seeking government intervention to tax or sanction bad

176. See Hirsch, Inner Environment, supra note 26, at 4 (comparing the information
revolution to the Industrial Revolution, which “generated an unprecedented level of
environmental degradation that far outstripped the ability of the existing legal system to deal
with it”).
177. See id. at 43 (proposing a cost per spam email that would render spam activity
unprofitable); see also Froomkin, supra note 170 (manuscript at 30) (proposing the use of
Privacy Impact Notices “before allowing large public or private projects which risk having a
significant impact on [privacy]”).
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institutional behavior, we follow in the tradition of Coase and
179
Ostrom,
and mine the economics literature for tools groups
themselves can use to sustain production of public goods, or in this
case to maintain privacy. We are inspired less by environmental law,
and more by the results of public-goods experiments. In taking this
approach, we focus less on rules restraining large-scale bad actors,
and more on the dilemma of groups seeking to cooperate in the face
of a social dilemma.
II. PRIVACY AS A PUBLIC GOOD
This Part draws on the past several decades’ worth of advances in
public-goods theory and experiments. The Part then highlights certain
specific group institutions, which appear repeatedly in this literature,
as being particularly worthy of consideration for building tools to help
groups resist the social dilemma of privacy.
A. Public Goods and Bads
Since public goods are desirable as a matter of definition, and
public bads are undesirable on a like definition, the question is why
there are too few public goods and too many public bads. The
difficulty lies in the interface between society and individual. If a
public good must be produced in order for it to exist, then the
radically nonrival nature of the good becomes a barrier to its
180
production. Since each individual shares in the good equally if
produced, individuals have no incentive to contribute to the costs of
181
producing the public good. Because such free riders benefit from

178. See CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 3, at 16 (“Governments were viewed as outside
agents who, through the imposition of taxes (or subsidies), could induce the externality
generator to limit (or increase) his or her activity so as to achieve efficiency.”).
179. DRAMA, supra note 31; Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1,
42–44 (1960).
180. Guido Pincione, Market Rights and the Rule of Law: The Case for Procedural
Constitutionalism, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 397, 414–15 (2003) (“Nobody has an incentive to
contribute to the production of a public good, since anybody can take a free ride on others’
productive efforts.”).
181. See id. Technically, the prediction that the good will not be provided at all hinges on
the definition of the production function. If this function is linear in the individual’s decision
variable, a rational individual only chooses between not contributing to the public good at all, or
contributing maximally. By the definition of the dilemma, the former prediction holds. If, by
contrast, the production function is nonlinear, the individual’s best response is no longer at the
corner, but in the interior of the action space. With this change in the production function the
dilemma does not go away. The good is still underprovided, to the bad is overprovided. The
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the public good regardless of whether they invest in creating it, each
182
individual has an incentive to free ride. Taken to its natural
conclusion, this means that although each person would be better off
(as a member of society) if the public good were produced, each
person will choose—as is predicted by neoclassical economic theory—
to maximize her own wellbeing (as an individual) by not
183
participating. The same goes for a public bad. If each individual
benefits from not suffering the bad, but earns individual income from
activity that contributes to that bad—and that income exceeds the
allocated share of the public bad caused by contribution that the
individual does suffer—then each individual will contribute to the
public bad even though the existence of the public bad harms
everyone, including that individual.
The logic of this point is worth stressing. In a social dilemma,
defection—by free riding on a public good, or contributing to a public
184
bad—is a dominant strategy. Cooperation, defined as contributing
to a public good, or refraining from contributing to a public bad, is
socially optimal, but an inferior strategy from the individual
perspective. If an individual seeks to maximize her own benefit, she
will defect irrespective of her expectations about others’ behavior. If
she believes that some or all others will cooperate, she is still best off
defecting. She enjoys the public good provided by the contributions
of others, and additionally enjoys the benefit from not having to
contribute. If, by contrast, she believes that all others will defect, she
will follow suit. If she were to be the only one to cooperate, she would
be even worse off. She would not enjoy the public good in its entirety,
but would lose the benefit of not having to contribute. The fact that
defection is a dominant strategy follows from the production function
that defines the public good. For the individual, her own contribution
to the public good has a benefit smaller than the cost.

individual only stops going to the extreme because damage on her would be too high. Classic
illustrations of nonlinear production functions are quadratic. They are typical for harvesting
natural resources beyond sustainability.
182. See id.
183. See id. at 415 (“So, unless the incentive structure changes, for example by charging user
fees, self-interested individuals will not cooperate in the production of public goods even if each
would obtain net benefits if those goods were produced.”).
184. See Ledyard, supra note 10, at 113.
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B. Privacy is a Public Good
Translated to privacy, the public-goods model assumes that at
least some individuals calculate the following way: If I disclose
information, I will receive a private benefit—access to an online site
or service, for example. This imposes a cost on me, based on the
personal information I have given up, and it imposes a cost on
everyone because I have contributed to the overall lack of privacy in
the culture. Yet as long as the sum of my direct costs and my share of
the social costs (resulting from my own release of private
information) is less than the private benefit I gain, I will choose to
give up information to access the site or service.
Thus, it makes sense to examine privacy as a social construct,
185
subject to the problems of social production. Indeed, we contend
that privacy is a public good as that term is strictly defined in the
economics literature. Privacy will fall prey to social dilemmas. In
weighing important decisions about privacy, individual and group
incentives diverge. And without measured intervention, individuals’
fully informed privacy decisions tend to reduce overall privacy, even
if everyone cherishes privacy equally and intensely.
One way to perceive the problem clearly is to consider lack of
privacy as a public bad, to which we all contribute when we post
information about ourselves that generates negative spillover effects.
Recall that public goods and public bads are mathematically identical,
with only the framing of the problem changing. The production
function for clean air can be expressed as the minimization of the
production function for creating pollution. This framing switch is a
powerful tool for understanding how privacy is a public good. It is
much easier to perceive the problem using the public-bads model.
1. The Public Bad of Lack of Privacy. Online, individuals
regularly face the following decision: they are invited to join some
Internet platform, knowing (more or less vaguely) that they will
indirectly pay by making personal information available. Take the
typical social network. The individual damage a user foresees when
leading an active online life seems reasonable. A user might reason
that the likelihood of negative consequences is low, and even if an
185. Cohen, supra note 2, at 1908 (“The self has no autonomous, precultural core, nor could
it, because we are born and remain situated within social and cultural contexts. And privacy is
not a fixed condition, nor could it be, because the individual’s relationship to social and cultural
contexts is dynamic.”).
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event were to occur, it likely would not be momentous. The user may
not perceive individual risk sufficient to stimulate abstention from the
immediate and personal benefits conveyed by use of the network.
The user knows she will reveal some information about her friends
and family. Maybe the user knows one of them to be particularly
vulnerable, but does not account for the risk of her own contributions
to data about that person—few people understand or even consider
that a message of sympathy in the event of illness might affect
healthcare premiums.
This is precisely the kind of reasoning the public-bads model
aims to capture. The user’s anticipated individual damage is too small
to outweigh anticipated benefit. Things would look differently if users
were to factor in the negative repercussions of being generous with
their private information on the privacy risk faced by others and vice
versa. Yet as long as each user only considers the potential damage to
herself, no individual would be concerned that anticipated damage
outweighs actual and anticipated benefit. If, however, each user were
to sum up the potential for damage resulting from her own and
everybody else’s disclosure, she would see that the social balance is
negative—implying that no one would want to join a social network
where the business model is based on disclosing private information.
Information-based public bads are not only a bad deal for the
community of users at the time information is revealed, they
potentially grow worse over time. The public bad of lack of privacy
increases over time as a function of rising data storage and parsing.
Technological increases in storage capacity and in the predictive
power of machine analytics undermine incentives to seek privacy.
Little is forgotten, and stored information can be put to ever-greater
uses. Storage has now increased so dramatically that the sum of all
recorded human information available in 2007 is merely a minute
186
fraction of the information stored and parsed today. Search
algorithms are now sufficiently advanced that this increased volume
of data does not act to obscure, but instead increasingly reveals
187
information about subjects. Individuals are less and less able to
186. Joshua A.T. Fairfield & Erik Luna, Digital Innocence, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 981, 998
(2014).
187. See Scott Shane, Data Storage Could Expand Reach of Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES: THE
CAUCUS (Aug. 14, 2012, 5:50 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/14/advances-indata-storage-have-implications-for-government-surveillance [https//perma.cc/K7M5-TZYB]
(“Government at every level is experimenting with sophisticated surveillance equipment whose
capabilities are improving as rapidly as every other kind of electronic technology. . . . It will
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control and monitor the damage that their revelations may cause to
themselves, let alone to others. Small contributions to the data pool
provide bigger results. Individuals who face the social dilemma of
privacy face three strong pressures to defect even if they are inclined
to cooperate: they realize that their individual efforts will only cost
them; that others will likewise defect over time; and that the
development of technology tends toward ever-greater intrusions on
privacy. No wonder, then, that even the most privacy-minded
consumers may eventually defect.
Treating privacy as a public good thus goes a long way toward
explaining the central conundrum of commercial privacy—why it is
that consumers claim to want privacy, but do not refuse valuable
goods and services that come at a significant privacy cost to both
themselves and others. We reject the facile answer that consumers are
lying about privacy preferences. The answer is that they believe that
due to the actions of society as a whole, they have no choice and no
privacy anyway. Under those circumstances it makes sense to give up
privacy-seeking behavior and seize what private benefit they can.
2. Mapping Social Harm. A key element of treating privacy as a
public good is that law must be able to recognize the social and
systemic harms caused by the collection, aggregation, and
exploitation of data. Courts tend to focus on specific harm to specific
188
complaining individuals, not undivided losses to social welfare.
189
Economists have a different sense of harm. Translating allocated
social-welfare harms into actionable legal rules will therefore require
patience and creativity.
One question is whether group privacy harms can be sufficiently
190
theorized to be legally cognizable. Early data-breach cases were
often dismissed on the grounds that plaintiffs had not yet suffered any
harm, because they could not show that their data had yet been
soon be technically feasible and affordable to record and store everything that can be recorded
about what everyone in a country says or does.”).
188. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1148–49 (2013) (holding that the
plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the future injury they purportedly feared was (1) certainly
impending and (2) fairly traceable to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act provision at
issue—specifically, a provision that allowed surveillance of individuals who were not ‘‘United
States persons’’ and were reasonably believed to be located outside the United States).
189. Sasha Romanosky & Alessandro Acquisti, Privacy Costs and Personal Data Protection:
Economic and Legal Perspectives, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1061, 1062 (2009).
190. See MacCarthy, supra note 1, at 456–68 (describing evolving categories of harm related
to information externalities).
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improperly used. As one court concluded, “[p]laintiffs lack standing
because their claims are future-oriented, hypothetical, and
192
conjectural. There is no ‘case or controversy.’”
It has therefore taken some time to convince courts to sanction
193
even direct, individual examples of data harm. The trend is
promising, however. Thus, “[t]he more recent trend . . . suggests that
in ‘lost data cases,’ an increased risk of harm, e.g., the risk of identity
194
theft, is an injury-in-fact sufficient to confer standing.” On the other
hand, the Supreme Court expressed skepticism in Clapper v. Amnesty
195
International
about whether plaintiffs who cannot show that
196
surveillance harm is “certainly impending” can sue.
Diffuse harms of the kind caused by public bads take
significantly more theory and experience to define than do direct and
individual harms. For example, it is commonplace for an institution to
suffer a data breach, yet to claim that no harm was done unless the
data is actively misused in individual cases. Courts do not give much

191. See Allison v. Aetna, Inc., No. 09-2560, 2010 WL 3719243, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2010);
Amburgy v. Express Scripts, Inc., 671 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1050 (E.D. Mo. 2009) (finding no injuryin-fact in the mere possibility of identity theft); In re TJX Cos. Retail Sec. Breach Litig., 246
F.R.D. 389, 400 (D. Mass. 2007); Kristen Blanchette, Civil Litigation: Security, in 1 DATA
SECURITY & PRIVACY LAW § 8.27 (Ronald N. Weikers ed., 2015) (“Putative class action
lawsuits for large scale data breaches are often dismissed during the initial stages of the
litigation because the plaintiffs failed to allege an injury-in-fact and, therefore, lack standing to
sue.”).
192. Hammond v. The Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., No. 08 Civ. 6060(RMB)(RLE), 2010 WL
2643307, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2010); see also Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 40 (3d
Cir. 2011) (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring suit against defendant corporation
after defendant suffered a security breach of plaintiff’s information); Lambert v. Hartman, 517
F.3d 433, 437 (6th Cir. 2008) (reviewing defendant’s claim that plaintiff lacked standing to bring
suit after defendant published personal identifying information from traffic citation on its
website); Robert D. Brownstone & Tyler G. Newby, Privacy Litigation, in 1 DATA SECURITY &
PRIVACY LAW, supra note 191, § 9:159 (“A frequent defense against various privacy theories,
including common law, is that the plaintiff has failed to allege an ‘injury-in-fact’ sufficient to
satisfy the standing requirement of Article III of the U.S. Constitution.”).
193. See Gavin Brody, DOD, Tricare Claim No Harm, No Foul in Data Theft Case,
LAW360 (Nov. 20, 2012, 5:31 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/395323/dod-tricare-claim-noharm-no-foul-in-data-theft-case [http://perma.cc/TJF9-3LZ4] (reporting on this issue in the
context of a data breach that affected 4.9 million Tricare beneficiaries).
194. See Anderson v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 659 F.3d 151, 166–67 (1st Cir. 2011);
McLoughlin v. People’s United Bank, Inc., No. 3:08-cv-00944(VLB), 2009 WL 2843269, at *4
(D. Conn. Aug. 31, 2009); Blanchette, supra note 191, § 8:28 (discussing Pisciotta v. Old National
Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2007)).
195. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
196. Id. at 1143.
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weight to the increase in systemic risk occasioned by the breach.
Yet such systemic harms almost certainly exist. One straightforward
example of social-data harm is the increase in systemic risk of identity
198
199
theft. The data pools created by companies are prime targets.
When an organization or company loses this information, the costs
are not borne merely by individuals, but by affected members of the
system and social groups. For example, a child of one of the authors
was a victim of the Anthem Health Data hack, requiring the author to
expend significant amounts of time and effort to contain the results.
In response, the legal culture has begun to recognize the social
200
harms resulting from data breaches. Law has also begun to respond,
not only to the individual harms, but also to the allocated social
harms of data practices. The theft of one piece of data is now more
201
dangerous, because it can be used to link to other pieces. Of course,
obtaining additional pieces of data further simplifies the identity
thief’s objective.

197. See Lyria Bennett Moses, Recurring Dilemmas: The Law’s Race to Keep Up with
Technological Change, 7 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 239, 239 (2007) (“It is often stated that the
law lags behind technology. As technology changes and creates new possibilities, lawyers and
legal scholars struggle to deal with the implications.”); John Burn-Murdoch, Data Protection
Law is in Danger of Lagging Behind Technological Change, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 12, 2013,
7:25 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2013/apr/12/data-protection-law-laggingbehind-technology [http://perma.cc/22CB-AZD6] (“Data processing practices are evolving
faster than the law can adapt to them, according to a senior British lawyer at an international
law firm specialising in data protection.”).
198. See J. Craig Anderson, Identity Theft Growing, Costly to Victims, USA TODAY (Apr.
14, 2013, 4:38 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/2013/04/14/identitytheft-growing/2082179 [http://perma.cc/4F6K-JENN] (“[I]dentity theft has become big business.
The number of malicious programs written to steal your information has grown exponentially to
an estimated 130 million from about 1 million in 2007.”).
199. See id. (“The most successful identity thieves have learned that it’s more lucrative to
hack into businesses, where they can steal card numbers by the thousands or even millions.”).
200. See, e.g., Anderson v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 659 F.3d 151, 167 (1st Cir. 2011)
(“Plaintiffs’ claims for identity theft insurance and replacement card fees involve actual financial
losses from credit and debit card misuse. Under Maine contract law, these financial losses are
recoverable as mitigation damages so long as they are reasonable.”); Ruiz v. Gap, Inc., 380 F.
App’x 689, 691 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[G]reater risk of identity theft presents enough of a risk that
the concerns of plaintiffs are real, and not merely speculative.”); see also MacCarthy, supra note
1, at 481 (“Harm can be probabilistic. Extra risk of harm is also a harm. . . . The increased risk of
identity theft is a measurable harm.”).
201. This point is forcefully argued by James Fallows, Hacked!, THE ATLANTIC MAG.
(Nov. 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/11/hacked/308673 [http://perma.
cc/F9ZN-NYFF].
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Thus, the trend has also begun to shift in class actions. In a 2015
202
case, Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, the Seventh Circuit
held that the class of plaintiffs met the pleading requirements for
standing in a class action responding to a hacking breach of retailer
Neiman Marcus—the closest the litigation system has come to
203
capturing group harms. The Remijas court noted that mitigation
costs incurred by plaintiffs in response to a perceived, speculative,
and remote harm were often insufficient to permit a plaintiff class to
recover, but reframed the loss of personal data as posing a much
204
more concrete risk. In distinguishing Clapper, the Seventh Circuit
noted:
Clapper was addressing speculative harm based on something that
may not even have happened to some or all of the plaintiffs. In our
case, Neiman Marcus does not contest the fact that the initial breach
took place. An affected customer, having been notified by Neiman
Marcus that her card is at risk, might think it necessary to subscribe
to a service that offers monthly credit monitoring. It is telling in this
connection that Neiman Marcus offered one year of credit
monitoring and identity-theft protection to all customers for whom
it had contact information and who had shopped at their stores
between January 2013 and January 2014. It is unlikely that it did so
205
because the risk is so ephemeral that it can safely be disregarded.

States have also been engaging in a concerted regulatory
response to combat systemic risks. The theory upon which much of
the recent state regulation has been based is that requiring companies
to reveal data breaches, often regardless of whether the data has been
used in the individual case, will permit consumers, insurers, and
defensive-software designers to mitigate systemic risk. In recent years
nearly every state has enacted breach-notification laws, and there is a
206
push for federal legislation on the topic.

202. Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, No. 14-3122, 2015 WL 4394814 (7th Cir. July 20,
2015).
203. Id. at *5.
204. See id.
205. Id.
206. See Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/security-breachnotification-laws.aspx [http://perma.cc/7EDG-KVBF] (“Forty-seven states, the District of
Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands have enacted legislation requiring private
or government entities to notify individuals of security breaches of information involving
personally identifiable information.”).
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Notification is merely a first step toward addressing systemic
social risk. A systematic and easily understandable account of the
social costs of privacy failures is critical in order to move forward.
Law often lags in setting definitions and boundaries for social harms,
207
and the data context is no exception. Theory and science are needed
to advance the ball. In the twentieth century, for example, law lagged
the science of the social costs of cigarette smoking or using products
208
like asbestos. The first cases were ones of direct harm. Later theory
and science established harm to wider categories of people impacted
by smoking or asbestos, even exposures to secondary effects decades
209
later. Similarly, it is reasonable to expect that, as legal theory and
data science develop, increasingly temporally distant and distributed
210
data harms will become increasingly distinct and legally cognizable.
Data pollution causes other social harms that, while
demonstrable, may need to be addressed outside of the individual211
centered forum of courts. For example, behavioral models derived
from consumer data do permit more deals to close, but they also
212
permit companies to extract nearly all of the consumer surplus. The
resulting wealth transfer is supposed to be worth efficiency gains, but
given declining marginal utility of wealth and the difference in wealth
levels between companies and consumers, these gains may actually be
social losses, especially if consumers suspect exploitation. Advertising
relies on models trained on large amounts of information, which then
207. MacCarthy, supra note 1, at 456–68; Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy:
Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1736 (2010).
208. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1082 (5th Cir. 1973) (en
banc) (affirming the panel’s decision that the plaintiff, an insulation worker, was entitled to go
to jury on the question of whether his injuries due to asbestos exposure were voluntary or a
result of unreasonable duress of circumstances).
209. See Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314, 1336–37 (5th Cir. 1985)
(“[N]ew groups of plaintiffs from different points along the line of distribution of asbestos are
emerging. Potential claimants include warehouse workers, truck drivers, longshoremen, and
spouses of workers exposed when the worker returned home covered with asbestos dust.”).
210. See Ohm, supra note 207, at 1733–35 (describing the history of privacy law and the
current shift to preventing harm caused by Personally Identifiable Information (PII)).
211. See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, No. 14-3122, 2015 WL 4394814, at *5 (7th
Cir. July 20, 2015) (“For the sake of completeness, we comment briefly on the other asserted
injuries. They are more problematic. We need not decide whether they would have sufficed for
standing on their own, but we are dubious.”).
212. See BERNASEK & MONGAN, supra note 68, at 17; Dana Mattioli, On Orbitz, Mac Users
Steered to Pricier Hotels, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 23, 2012, 6:07 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB
10001424052702304458604577488822667325882 [http://perma.cc/9ZB4-YZ28] (“[T]he online
travel agency is starting to show them different, and sometimes costlier, travel options than
Windows visitors see.”).
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can be quickly matched to what an advertiser knows about a specific
individual. The more information available, the more accurate the
213
advertisement model is. Consider the mechanism behind advertising
selection. When a user enters a website, some parts of the site support
advertisements. Those advertisements are targeted by means of a
rapid, behind-the-scenes auction, in which the parties who wish to
advertise to the user attempt to determine how much that user’s
214
attention is worth to them. The better the match between the user’s
proclivity to buy and the advertisement on offer, the higher the
215
Person A’s contributions to the fine-tuning of the
price.
advertisement model therefore impact Person B, and do so in a way
that Person A is not likely to fully grasp or deceives her outright. The
more the advertising company knows about the potential customer,
the better its ability to confront the customer with a message she is
216
very unlikely to resist.
A further important appeal of data mining does not result from
targeted advertising, but from targeting the actual offer. Behavioral
217
models derived from consumer data drive up prices. For most
products, consumers’ willingness to pay varies widely, both between
and within consumers. Some consumers crave the new product, while
others would only buy at a price that equals the marginal cost of
producing another unit. And most individuals cherish the first unit of
the new good much more than any additional unit. The more a
provider knows about a customer’s preferences, income, wealth and
213. See Doug Henschen, Analytics Gets More Accurate, More Accessible, INFO. WEEK
(Nov. 15, 2012, 5:10 PM), http://www.informationweek.com/big-data/big-data-analytics/
analytics-gets-more-accurate-more-accessible/d/d-id/1107416? [https://perma.cc/249Y-7S9P]
(“The more data companies use, the more accurate their predictions become.”).
214. See Ad Targeting: About the Ad Auction, GOOGLE ADSENSE, https://support.google.
com/adsense/answer/160525?hl=en [https://perma.cc/MZ8G-VXW3] (“[O]ur ad auction allows
advertisers to state the price they’re willing to pay for clicks on ads or for impressions served on
AdSense pages.”).
215. See Ad Targeting: About Smart Pricing, GOOGLE ADSENSE, https://support.google.
com/adsense/answer/190436?hl=en&ref_topic=1628432 [https://perma.cc/BW2R-JQSC].
216. Note that we depart from economic orthodoxy in that we do not consider pure seller
price discrimination to be an undivided good. Perfect price discrimination is often seen as a
route to economic efficiency, permitting sellers to offer the cheapest deals to those who can pay
the least. Yet it is not—it merely ensures that the seller captures value that would otherwise
inure to the consumer as consumer surplus. Given the well-established declining marginal value
of wealth, we do not see wealth transfers from consumers to corporations in the data market to
maximize overall welfare. See Matthew A. Edwards, Price and Prejudice: The Case Against
Consumer Equality in the Information Age, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 559, 592 (2006)
(discussing perfect price discrimination and efficient outputs).
217. See BERNASEK & MONGAN, supra note 68, at 92–98.
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consumption patterns, the better it can exploit her by offering the
product at a price that this customer, in this situation, still finds
218
acceptable. Often the provider has yet another degree of freedom.
It can customize the product itself, and make this customer an offer
that is just too good to resist. The customized product certainly gives
the consumer additional value; otherwise she would not buy it. But
the producer engages in customization because she stands to gain
219
much more than the consumer. In the technical language of
microeconomics, the producer aims at appropriating the lion’s share
of what, with a standardized product, would have been the
220
consumer’s rent.
The former outcome is of course a classic of microeconomic
theory, and is known as perfect price discrimination. The latter can be
referred to as perfect product differentiation: each customer gets a
personalized product that perfectly matches her preferences. In the
pure world of economic models, perfect price and product
discrimination only raise an issue of distributional justice. Producers
have found a way to appropriate the total social surplus. Efficiency
still obtains. Yet one reaches this result only if consumers are willing
to accept any small gain, even if it is grossly inequitable. A standard
result from experimental economics shows that this assumption is
likely incorrect. The situation is akin to an ultimatum game. In this
game, a proposer has power to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer for
splitting an amount of money received from the experimenter. If the
offer is rejected, the endowment is forfeited. If the responder indeed
maximizes profit, the proposer may leave the responder with the
smallest positive increment, and keep the remainder for herself. Yet
in the lab, such offers are almost surely rejected. Experimental
participants would rather burn money than let the proposer exploit
221
them. The same is to be expected with producers using perfect
product differentiation to exploit consumers. If this is what happens,
not only do individual consumers suffer, but society at large suffers

218. Id.
219. Id. at 108–113.
220. Id.
221. See generally Werner Güth, Rolf Schmittberger & Bernd Schwarze, An Experimental
Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining, 3 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 367, 382 (1982) (“[P]layers 2 are
willing to suffer a monetary loss if they consider the demand of player 1 as unacceptable.”). For
a meta-study of the burgeoning experimental literature using this game, see generally David J.
Cooper & E. Glenn Dutcher, The Dynamics of Responder Behavior in Ultimatum Games: A
Meta-Study, 14 EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 519 (2011).
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along with them. A “deadweight loss” results from the fact that a
relevant portion of demand that could have been served at prices
below marginal cost actually never buys.
Big data harms go well beyond user risk or consumer
exploitation. Lack of privacy also harms the body politic, and
222
therefore some remedial efforts must be political. Privacy is
223
important to basic democratic processes.
It is important for
224
independent decision making. Privacy has been described as a
human right, although this perspective has received more focused
225
attention in Europe than in the United States. Even in the United
States, the revelations of Edward Snowden show the potential danger
226
of unrestricted corporate gathering of consumer information. The
large amount of information gathered by companies was placed at the
227
disposal of the NSA through the PRISM program. Other news
revelations have focused on metadata collection. The telephonymetadata collection typified by the Verizon Order appears to rely on
the collaboration of telecommunications intermediaries to hand off
information routinely gathered in the course of operation of the
228
company. Under the order, Verizon (and other companies, it is safe
to assume) must hand off this information to government actors on an
222. See Solove, Privacy, supra note 64, at 1153 (“[A] conception of privacy that view[s] it as
a discrete harm, akin to a tort harm . . . is a constrained way to view the disruption created by
the aggregation and uncontrolled uses of personal information by private sector bureaucracies.
This disruption of the way that power is allocated between individuals and large corporations
goes to the structure of our society as a whole.”).
223. See Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy, supra note 108, at 1649 (“From the civic
republican perspective, the true promise of the internet will not be as a place for electronic
commerce, but as a forum for deliberative democracy.”).
224. See id. at 1656.
225. Robin D. Barnes, The Caroline Verdict: Protecting Individual Privacy Against Media
Invasion As A Matter of Human Rights, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 599, 599 (2006).
226. See, e.g., Mark Mazzetti & Michael S. Schmidt, Ex-Worker at C.I.A. Says He Leaked
Data on Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/10/us/
former-cia-worker-says-he-leaked-surveillance-data.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/4XVZ-HC64]
(discussing the backdrop to, and possible ramifications of, Edward Snowden’s disclosure of
classified intelligence information).
227. See Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data from Nine
U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. POST (June 6, 2013), http://articles.
washingtonpost.com/2013-06-06/news/39784046_1_prism-nsa-u-s-servers [http://perma.cc/L9HSNGPY].
228. See James Ball, Verizon Court Order: Telephone Call Metadata and What It Can Show,
THE GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013, 10:12 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/
phone-call-metadata-information-authorities [http://perma.cc/8LP3-AGWP] (discussing
U.S.
government collection of telephony metadata retained by telecommunications service
providers).
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ongoing and forward-looking basis. Pervasive government
surveillance is not a positive democratic or humanitarian value. The
damage is both personal and social. Citizens have begun to censor
229
230
themselves online. Surveillance has already chilled discourse.
Socially, large pools of corporate-gathered data damage the societies
231
that generate them.
Throughout, evidence suggests a slow evolution of law and
theory from a sense of the individual damage of loss of privacy to its
social cost. This Part therefore concludes that privacy and publicgoods models fit together with respect to the harms caused.
Individual contributions both yield a private benefit (ostensibly free
services) and negatively impact others’ privacy. Individual incentives
to protect privacy track individual incentives in a public-goods model.
The lack of privacy which results from the social dilemma corrodes
further attempts to cooperate as people become discouraged, see
others give in, and observe the growing strength of data mining. In
each of these ways and more, pooled data harms citizens individually,
in groups, and as a body politic. We are therefore confident that
privacy harms track those recognizable from public-goods analysis.
III. APPLYING PUBLIC-GOODS THEORY TO PRIVACY PROBLEMS
In this Part, we draw on the broad and untapped neoclassicaland behavioral-economics literature to seek new paths for the legal
debate over privacy. As noted above, that debate does not adequately
account for negative externalities on others resulting from disclosing
private information. This Part therefore explores and tests solutions
developed in the neoclassical- and behavioral-economics literature to
ascertain the degree of useful fit for the social dilemma of privacy.

229. See Sauvik Das & Adam Kramer, Self-Censorship on Facebook, in PROCEEDINGS OF
SEVENTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WEBLOGS AND SOCIAL MEDIA 120, 125
(2013), http://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/ICWSM/ICWSM13/paper/viewFile/6093/6350 [http://
perma.cc/8DW9-CMT5] (finding that 71 percent of Facebook users engaged in last-minute selfcensorship).
230. See, e.g., BJ Ard, Confidentiality and the Problem of Third Parties: Protecting Reader
Privacy in the Age of Intermediaries, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 8 (2014) (arguing that, in an
increasingly digitized age, the current regime’s protection of providers of reading material, such
as libraries, rather than protecting the reading material itself, leaves gaps in intellectual privacy
when readers procure their materials from third parties like Amazon).
231. See, e.g., ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 207 (1971) (noting that with
“electronic surveillance, the climate or atmosphere of suspicion created by an accumulation of
invasions of privacy is of far greater concern than the direct harm caused by the incidents
themselves”).

THE
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Because we chiefly suggest normative approaches based on
experimental results, some caveats are in order regarding the nature
of experiments. Experiments do not attempt to describe what a thing
232
is, but rather how one factor operates in conjunction with others.
Experiments provide two important advantages: they “make it
possible to study phenomena that are hard, if not impossible, to
observe in the field,” and they allow experimenters, through
randomization, to solve what empirical social scientists tend to call
233
identification problems. A typical experiment consists of a baseline
and a treatment. Participants are randomly assigned to either
condition. Baseline and treatment differ by one, and only one, feature
of the design. On these conditions, a significant difference between
the baseline and the treatment is proof that the one difference in
234
design causes the difference in outcome. Because experiments seek
to narrow the range of interaction, they do not capture every feature
available. Indeed, they must exclude any other variable that could
confound the result. It is therefore not a strong criticism to point out
that an experiment has left something out, especially something that
would have altered the experiment’s outcome. That is what
experiments must do.
This rigorous approach does leave a gap, however.
Experimentalists generally refrain from offering normative or policy
approaches grounded in their work, largely because some of the
factors that have been left out to solve the identification problem may
comprise important parts of the policy problem. This is where legal
analysis and theory can provide some help. Lawyers fit studies to
cases. They are skilled contextualists, trained to focus on the elements
of different contexts that make the difference between different cases.
Thus, while it might be unseemly for scientists to make normative
suggestions based on their individual experimental findings, it is
necessary for policy makers—and this includes legal theorists—to
engage with the policy implications of the research. This is all the
more necessary because legal theorists often overindulge in theory at

232. See Christoph Engel, Legal Experiments—Mission Impossible? 7 (June 9, 2013)
(unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2276566_code251
559.pdf?abstractid=2276566&mirid=1 [http://perma.cc/BD54-FGGZ].
233. Id. at 1, 7.
234. See id. at 7.
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the expense of checking intuitions against data generated in carefully
235
controlled experiments.
This Part attempts to express the best of both worlds. It draws on
the past several decades’ worth of experimental evidence on group
coordination in the face of social dilemmas before pushing beyond
the narrow findings of experiments to suggest normative approaches
that might improve privacy protection for groups. We suggest
potentially useful new approaches to a field of study that has a
tendency to become mired in ontological debates. The purpose is not
to suggest that the economic and experimental literatures lead
ineluctably to these conclusions. Rather, the literature points the way
toward possible solutions that have been unexplored or
underexplored. This is the pleasant task of an early mover in a given
subject: to point out what might work.
A. Repeated Interaction
Repeat play is a critically important feature impacting
coordination on group welfare. If two anonymous individuals meet
once, it may be that standard economic theory gets it right, and each
may act selfishly (although query, then, why people usually tip
waiters). These two individuals have no reason to care for each other,
other than the circumstances under which they meet. The economic
theory of public goods is just a rigorous way of defining these
circumstances. Economists model these circumstances as a game.
Players best respond to what they know or expect the other player to
do. If this game is a dilemma, players need not even go that far.
Whatever the other player decides to do, they maximize their
personal payoff by misbehaving. In some respects, this is an adequate
model for the problem of online privacy. A world of strangers is one
in which I am unlikely to encounter someone again in a way that my
past track record or future cooperation will matter.
Yet the Internet is not purely organized out of an
undifferentiated mass of strangers, but rather nested smaller groups
236
with higher frequencies of repeat play. Within such nested groups,

235. See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 9 (2002)
(“Too much legal scholarship ignores the rules of inference and applies instead the ‘rules’ of
persuasion and advocacy. These ‘rules’ have an important place in legal studies, but not when
the goal is to learn about the empirical world.”).
236. See Kosinski et al., supra note 131, at 5802 (noting, for instance, how “location within a
friendship network at Facebook was shown to be predictive of sexual orientation”).
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people may reasonably consider the impact defections may have on
others’ future incentive to cooperate. If I post an embarrassing
picture of my friend on Facebook, she might do the same to me
tomorrow. In such situations, it is more plausible to model the
interaction as a repeated game. Typically it will be appropriate to
think of a game that does not have a precisely defined, ex ante known
end. If one seeks to induce cooperation in groups, this is good news.
A repeated game with an unknown end entails a credible shadow of
the future. If it becomes known that I have misbehaved by recklessly
sharing dangerous information, others may sanction me, or simply
237
start doing the same. The value of future cooperation may sustain
present cooperation.
However, if the end of the game is known in advance, then the
theoretical prediction of cooperation changes. In the real world,
counterparties rarely know with perfect certainty when a relationship
ends. But some situations at least come close. Consider how a
disgruntled employee’s incentives shift once she has given two-weeks
notice. Unless she expects a positive letter of recommendation, she is
unlikely to make personal sacrifices for the good of the firm. Worse,
she may actively act in her own best interests against the interests of
the group, by erasing data, or taking valuable information with her to
start a competing business. This is a textbook “final period problem,”
in which groups decohere when members know they will obtain little
238
or no benefit from their continued cooperation. Imagine that a
player considers whether to defect or cooperate in a public-bads
game. The player would determine whether to defect by contributing
to the public bad, for which she receives a personal profit, or refrain
from contributing, which means that she only keeps her endowment.
She may decide to cooperate because the future benefits of
cooperation outweigh the single-turn payout she receives from
defecting. In the last round of the game, however, she no longer has
237. Game theorists refer to this result as the “folk theorem.” See generally Robert Aumann
& Lloyd Shapley, Long Term Competition—A Game Theoretic Analysis, 14 ANNALS ECON. &
FIN. 609 (2013) (discussing game-theoretic models of cooperation between competitive actors
when iterated interactions present the possibility of future benefits from present cooperative
behavior). For an application of the folk theorem to a public good, see generally Kreps et al.,
supra note 48.
238. See JESSE H. CHOPER, JOHN C. COFFEE JR. & RONALD J. GILSON, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 566–67 (6th ed. 2004) (“In this ‘end game,’ there is greater
reason for managers to act opportunistically. . . . Economists call this a ‘final period’ problem,
referring to the fact that the agent no longer has the same incentives to serve the principal
faithfully.”).
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an incentive to invest in the future, and will defect. Cooperation will
disintegrate as players realize that defecting earlier and earlier is a
239
more profitable option, especially if they expect others do the same.
By this process, termed “unraveling,” neoclassical economics predicts
240
that players will defect from the very first round on.
Behavioral economists have discovered some interesting tools
241
for dealing with unraveling. The certainty that a relationship will
end does not seem to matter as long as counterparties are uncertain
242
as to when. If the likelihood of the game ending at any given point is
random—that is, the game may end each round but it does not do so
with certainty—then cooperation can be sustained in the face of
unraveling. Players can sustain cooperation when they no longer
know exactly when a mutually beneficial relationship will come to an
end.
A closely related phenomenon is that players may consider the
chance of other players defecting. This could either be defection in
response to the defection of the deciding player, or it might be
outright defection given the incentives the group faces. A player will
cooperate if a game has a certain length, and she does not expect
other players to exploit her with certainty. As a matter of fact,
cooperation can be sustained if the deciding player believes that other
players might defect, but the game is long enough that the benefits of
future cooperation are worth the risk. Thus, cooperation is
sustainable in groups when the endpoint of cooperation is not
previously established and when other people do not expect
necessarily to be exploited.
There is also cause for optimism because the experimental
literature does not support the theoretical prediction of unraveling
and complete defection, even when there is a known game end. In
experiment after experiment, group members are willing to cooperate
at the beginning, but learn over time to defect, because cooperation is
239. See Hans-Theo Normann & Brian Wallace, The Impact of the Termination Rule on
Cooperation in a Prisoner’s Dilemma Experiment, 41 INT’L. J. GAME THEORY 707, 709 (2012).
240. See, e.g., id. at 708; Robert W. Rosenthal, Games of Perfect Information, Predatory
Pricing and the Chain Store Paradox, 25 J. ECON. THEORY 92, 92–99 (1982) (theorizing that a
rational player will take an immediate payoff that ends the game, rather than continuing to play
for a possibly higher payoff, because the player assumes his opponent is also rational and would
do the same); Selten, supra note 48, at 130–33.
241. See Normann & Wallace, supra note 239, at 708–11 (describing a variety of approaches
to game termination designed to address cooperation issues that arise in prisoner’s-dilemma
games).
242. See id. at 708–09.
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punished in a social dilemma. This suggests that people come to
social dilemmas with life experiences or cultural commitments that
make them predisposed to cooperate at higher rates than neoclassical
244
economics would predict. This is likely because people know from
experience that they cannot predict when another person may impact
their life. Cooperation as a default is a response to the general
unpredictability of social life.
Repeat play can produce cooperation as long as the end of the
game is not known with certainty, and in experiments, subjects
demonstrate a willingness to cooperate early on even where the game
end is known. However, repeat play can also corrode cooperation
through the repeated experience of being punished by the social
dilemma. Absent some form of institutional backing, cooperation is
not stable. The longer participants unsuccessfully interact, the more
245
cooperation decreases.
Effective application requires accounting for each of these
effects. Fostering repeat play among more tightly knit online groups
may foster cooperative behavior and reduce intentional malicious
disclosures. On the other hand, repeated fruitless attempts to protect
246
privacy are likely to induce an effect akin to learned helplessness.
Applying this insight to privacy, we note that features that
remind users of the value of cooperation given the shadow of the
future are built into social networks, but they are not ones commonly
expected to produce privacy gains. First, certain aspects of social
networks act to remind users that they are repeat players. Friends of
friends appear on personal walls. Routine “Do you know x? He is a
friend of y.” reminders are sent out by the social networks in order to
247
encourage users to expand their personal networks. Social networks

243. See Ledyard, supra note 10, at 146–47 (surveying experimental evidence of decrease in
contribution to public good by repetition).
244. For a study of cultural constraints that produce ordered systems without government
intervention, see ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES 123–27 (1991).
245. See Blair & Stout, supra note 42, at 1763 (“[E]xperimental studies show . . . [that]
cooperation rates are lower in reiterated play than in one-shot games.”).
246. See Steven F. Maier & Martin E. Seligman, Learned Helplessness: Theory and
Evidence, 105 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 3, 3 (1976) (“[T]he learned helplessness
hypothesis . . . argues that when events are uncontrollable [an] organism learns that its behavior
and outcomes are independent, and that this learning produces the motivational, cognitive, and
emotional effects of uncontrollability.”).
247. People You May Know, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/501283333222485
[http://perma.cc/MBY8-3NP7].
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routinely scrape email lists, for example, to permit users to re-create
their network of contacts within the network. These low-level
reminders of the connection group members have with one another
need not be limited to the moment a user joins the network. One
might imagine a “featured contact” widget that serves to remind users
of contacts with whom they have not spoken in some time, thus
raising the perception of repeat play at the edges of an individual’s
network. Even more valuable, given the insights regarding inequity
aversion and reciprocity below, would be aggressive promotion of the
privacy-seeking actions others are taking. In the same way that a
network could inform a user that a friend is using or enjoying a
movie, the network could inform a user that a friend is using an
encrypted chat feature and has requested a key exchange. Even
248
spreading “likes” of privacy-enhancing technologies would help.
It should similarly be possible to ameliorate the corrosive effects
of repeat play. One step would be to give full force to consumer
expectations of privacy through simplified terms of service and opt-in
permission each time the information is reshared or sold forward.
Even simpler tools might assist, however. For example, users are
already in part empowered to delink their social-network content
from posts or unflag from photographs that purport to represent
them. This means that although they cannot control viral outbreaks of
content about them, they may have some ability to manage the
degree to which others use their data without consent. Individual
actions taken to minimize the damage of others’ disclosures should
provide users with strong, immediate feedback and verifiable results,

248. Such tools may align with the incentives of the social network. Providers are often
willing to protect users’ data from certain privacy threats because they monetize that data and
want no competitors—examples would be Facebook’s protection of user data from crawlers, see
Grégoire Jacob, Engin Kirda, Christopher Kruegel & Giovanni Vigna, PubCrawl: Protecting
Users and Businesses From CRAWLers, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-FIRST USENIX
CONFERENCE ON SECURITY SYMPOSIUM 507, 507 (2012), https://www.usenix.org/system/
files/conference/usenixsecurity12/sec12-final30.pdf [https://perma.cc/33X2-CDBN] (“In 2010,
Facebook sued an entrepreneur who crawled more than 200 million profiles, and who was
planning to create a third-party search service with the data he had collected.”), or Google’s use
of strong encryption in response to the Snowden revelations, see Nicole Perlroth, Experts
Oppose Government Key to Encoded Data, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2015, at A1 (“Technology
companies including Apple, Microsoft and Google have been moving to encrypt more of their
corporate and customer data after learning that the National Security Agency and its
counterparts were siphoning off digital communications and hacking into corporate data
centers.”).
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to avoid the corrosion engendered by repeated experiences of
249
failure.
B. Group Characteristics
This Subpart turns from an examination of repeated interaction
to an analysis of the impact of group composition. The simple
mechanism of the public-goods experiment divides individual from
group incentives. The currently overexact focus of privacy theory on
individuals should thus be supplemented with an understanding of
how groups work. Thus, the observable characteristics of the group
250
matter. One cannot tell how an individual will act with respect to a
given challenge—say, that of preventing pollution or providing
privacy—without knowing the characteristics of the group in which
251
she finds herself.
For a starting point, we rely on John Ledyard’s parsing of
252
characteristics that seem to impact group behavior.
Ledyard
identifies well over twenty characteristics that psychologists and
experimental economists have examined for impact on group
253
behavior. Subsequent research has identified even more. We have
the happy task of picking those that we believe will have the greatest
bearing on privacy in the age of social media and big data, but our list
is by no means exhaustive. The following Subparts therefore discuss a
range of group characteristics that bear on groups’ ability to

249. A legitimate although ultimately tangential question is whether companies would have
the incentive to build such tools. We merely claim that these tools might work for groups, and
do not argue who should make them. But we note that the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC)
current approach is consistent with an implementation of our suggestions. The FTC has tended
to leave space for self-regulation by suggesting approaches for incorporating pro-privacy
features while sanctioning only marked cases of deception or unfairness. See FTC v. Wyndham
Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 612–15 (D.N.J. 2014) (upholding the FTC’s unfairness
authority in the data-security context); see also Ira S. Rubinstein, Regulating Privacy by Design,
26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1409, 1411 (2011) (“In the United States, a recent staff report of the
[FTC] describes a Proposed Framework with three main components: privacy by design,
simplified consumer choice, and increased transparency of data practices.”); Solove & Hartzog,
supra note 126, at 667 (noting that the FTC has recently begun taking enforcement action
against broken expectations of consumer privacy, rather than broken promises of privacy).
250. See Ledyard, supra note 10, at 113 (“Economic theory suggests that it may be possible
to change the institutions by which group choices are made in a way that causes the outcome to
be closer to the group optimum.”).
251. See id. (“To know how to do that, however, requires anticipating how individual
choices will change as the institutions change.”).
252. Id. at 141–42.
253. Id. at 142–43.
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cooperate, and which we think have some relevance to the policy
debate surrounding online privacy.
1. Size. Because many online social networks are colossal, and
because we intuit that group size affects the ability to coordinate to
achieve group outcomes, group size is a natural place to start mining
254
the literature for insights about social networks and privacy. Social
diffusion is popularly understood to reduce incentives to take
individual, positive, costly action. The well-known murder of Kitty
Genovese is often used as an example to demonstrate the impact of
255
diffuse responsibility on an individual’s incentive to help. Each
person thinks that someone else will surely help, and so no one does.
Based on this intuition, early experimental efforts focused on the
256
cooperative impact of increasing group size.
The experimental findings both confirmed and challenged
conventional wisdom. Although evidence supported the claim that
increases in group size lead to decreases in the ability of the body to
allocate resources efficiently—in this case, by securing enough
contributions to a public good—they did not support the hypothesis
257
that purely increasing numbers decreased group capabilities.
Instead, economists Mark Isaac and James Walker, who have tested
this question in the lab, found that the less players received from
cooperating (their marginal per-capita return, or MPCR), the less the
258
players cooperated to produce the public good. Provided the
individual profitability of contributing to the public (the MPCR) is
held constant, experiments yielded little evidence of a pure effect of
259
group size. It appears that with a sufficient MPCR, even large
260
groups can produce public goods. Later experiments by Isaac,

254. See R. Mark. Isaac & James M. Walker, Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision:
The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism, 103 Q.J. ECON. 179, 179 (1988).
255. See Tal Z. Zarsky, Thinking Outside the Box: Considering Transparency, Anonymity,
and Pseudonymity As Overall Solutions to the Problems of Information Privacy in the Internet
Society, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 991, 1008 (2004) (“Research has shown that when large groups of
people witness acts of violence or anti-social behavior, responsibility tends to diffuse among the
witnesses.”).
256. See Isaac & Walker, supra note 254, at 184.
257. See id. at 179–80.
258. Id. at 179–82.
259. Although the impact of MPCR declines in larger groups, the effect remains positive
and significant. See id. at 196–97.
260. Chaudhuri, supra note 10, at 48–49 (“[C]ontrary to intuition larger groups are no
worse—and may even be better—at providing the public good than smaller ones.”).
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Walker, and fellow economist Arlington Williams confirmed that
larger groups could be more efficient than small ones at producing
261
public goods. These results provide a ray of hope for large social
networks, or large groups of friends nested within such networks.
Isaac and Walker distinguish between “pure” and “impure”
public goods. By “impure” they mean that an increase in group size
262
reduces the marginal benefit from contributing to the public good.
For such groups, the increase in size decreases MPCR, thus
decreasing cooperation. For pure public goods, increase in size does
not decrease MPCR, and therefore does not decrease cooperation.
Following this distinction, it may be useful to ask whether privacy is
best theorized as a pure or impure public good. Most goods fall
263
somewhere in a range between public and private. Commentators
note:
The in-between points [between purely private and purely public
goods] are occupied by impure public goods, whose benefits are
partially rival and/or partially excludable. If, therefore, a good does
not display both excludability (nonexcludability) and rivalry
(nonrivalry) in their pure forms, the good is called impurely
264
public.

Privacy has some attributes of a private good. My own privacy
inures both to my private benefit in ways that affect me alone, and my
privacy-seeking behavior positively affects others. Privacy can
therefore be modeled as impurely public. Likewise, lack of privacy
seems to scale nonlinearly with the number of contributors to a
system. What a social network knows grows nonlinearly as a function
of the number of participants and their contributions. Thus, it seems
plausible that the number of participants could impact privacy’s
social-production function. If this is the case, then the MPCR of
privacy-seeking behavior will fall as the number of participants
increases. This, in turn, might cause underproduction of privacy.
261. See R. Mark Isaac, James M. Walker & Arlington W. Williams, Group Size and the
Voluntary Provision of Public Goods, 54 J. PUB. ECON. 1, 30 (1994) (“Decision-making groups
of size 4, 10, 40, and 100 provide replicable results contradicting the widely held premise that a
group’s ability to provide the optimal level of a pure public good is inversely related to group
size.”).
262. See id.
263. See CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 3, at 9 (“The literature often treats certain types
of physical goods or services as inherently possessing rivalry or nonrivalry, excludability or
nonexcludability. However, this can sometimes be dangerous.”).
264. Id.
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On the other end of the spectrum, we can model privacy as
approaching a pure public good. One person’s consumption of
privacy—say, a couple’s decision to delay the announcement of a
pregnancy—impacts those nearest to them, but may not have much
impact on those with whom they do not share a social circle. The
switch from primarily impure to approaching pure is likely a fairly
rapid falloff once we are discussing the privacy of friends of friends of
friends.
From this literature we can draw several insights. First, the
MPCR, or, in the case of a public bad, the marginal per-capita loss,
within social media may not be high enough to sustain cooperation to
avoid accumulating public bads. Isaac and Walker flagged highnumber, low-MPCR systems as those most likely to be plagued by
efficiency problems. This describes social-media networks and mobile
social media fairly directly. In these systems, the losses are so small
and nonspecific that users may overcontribute to the system without
realizing it. Tiny amounts of damaging data, logged from thousands of
different sources, may not incentivize users to avoid loss, in the same
way that smaller amounts of per-capita return, when spread across a
larger number of players, are less likely to induce efficient
contribution to a public good.
To the extent privacy is best modeled as impure, keeping nested
groups tight and intimately connected might foster positive
cooperation and increase the value of MPCR as a tool for promoting
more cooperation. One user’s contributions of data impact those
close to her much more strongly. Small, tightly nested groups are the
best place to leverage MPCR, since the users not only have an effect
265
on each other, but care about the effects they have. The MPCR of
privacy in the narrower circle is higher, the connections tighter, and
the probability of future cooperation likewise higher. Tools to protect
266
the privacy of friends will help nested groups produce privacy. A
good example of useful tools would be controls, already enabled in
certain networks, which permit users to differentiate between narrow
groups of family and friends, and broader groups of acquaintances.
This does, of course, involve a trade-off because users must identify
different social circles, but they gain more than they lose by keeping
family business in the family.

265. Id.
266. Id.
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To the extent privacy approaches a pure public good—as appears
to be the case if one considers the broad run of the Internet without
reference to tighter, smaller groups—we are comforted that Isaac,
Walker, and Williams posit at least an equal, if not superior, ability to
deliver the public good. The experimental evidence provides reason
to believe the size of groups, alone, does not disqualify them from
cooperating on better privacy outcomes. This has positive policy
implications: the further away (not necessarily in a physical sense)
someone is from my social network, the less incentive I have to pry
into their personal life, and the greater my incentive may be to
contribute to systems that protect everyone across the system.
2. Player Heterogeneity and Conditional Cooperation. The
literature that followed then began to look more closely at group
composition in order to find out why some groups can provide public
267
goods and others fail. As one commenter notes, “The most notable
[recent] finding in the area is that many participants behave as
‘conditional cooperators,’ whose contribution to the public good is
positively correlated with their beliefs about the contributions to be
268
made by their group members.” Conditional cooperators are not
altruists. They do not aim at improving others’ utility, irrespective of
who those others are or what they do. But if a conditional cooperator
is sufficiently optimistic that others will resist the temptation to
exploit them, they are willing to resist that temptation as well. In the
context of online information sharing, conditional cooperation
implies that an individual is willing to resist the immediate urge to
post some piece of information, and thereby to expose others to
informational risk, as long as she is sufficiently optimistic that many
others will also be cautious. Thus, who one plays with is as important
269
as the rules of the game or the number of players. “This idea that
there may be different types of players” was suggested by prior
literature, but has only been systematically explored in the last
270
decade.

267. See Chaudhuri, supra note 10, at 48.
268. See id. at 49.
269. See id.
270. See id. (“We have now come to realize that the usual decaying pattern of contributions
can be better understood by appealing to heterogeneity in the types of players interacting with
one another.”).

FAIRFIELD AND ENGEL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

PRIVACY AS A PUBLIC GOOD

11/20/2015 3:26 PM

445

The experiments that have identified conditional cooperation
271
test participants in the context of simultaneous one-shot games. In
the field, however, many more options are available to a person
seeking to determine whether to make private information available
online. Even if not within the confines of a group of known others,
the individual has had a chance to observe the online platform for a
while. In the technical language of behavioral economics, such a
person is not forced to rely exclusively on her beliefs, and may update
beliefs through her own experiences or those of others, and the
individual has little reason to expect others to manipulate her
272
impressions. This is good news. If conditional cooperation is as
relevant for information sharing as it is for monetary contributions to
experimental public-good games, chances are that the information
owners will cooperate to at least mitigate the dilemma. One could
expect them to act to mitigate privacy harms as long as they gain the
impression that a sufficient fraction of the relevant population will do
the same.
The motives that drive conditional cooperation are not yet finally
settled. Two explanations have found considerable experimental
273
support: distributional equity (“inequity aversion”),
and
274
reciprocity. Inequity aversion exclusively looks at outcomes. A
person is inequity averse if she cares not only about absolute profit,
but also about relative profit. Inequity-averse individuals do not want
to get less than others, and also possibly feel uncomfortable when
they get more than others. In the context of online information
sharing, inequity aversion could support conditional cooperation if
the typical user of the platform in question perceives most other users
271. See generally Urs Fischbacher & Simon Gächter, Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the
Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods Experiments, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 541 (2010)
(measuring participants’ cooperation preferences as well as participants’ beliefs about others’
contributions); Urs Fischbacher, Simon Gächter & Ernst Fehr, Are People Conditionally
Cooperative? Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment, 71 ECON. LETTERS 397 (2001) (stating
that participants played the game knowing they would not be exposed to the other participants
again).
272. For a canonical treatment, see generally Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J.
ECON. 355 (1973).
273. See Chaudhuri, supra note 10, at 50 (discussing Ernst Fehr & Klaus Schmidt, A Theory
of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation, 114 Q.J. Econ. 817 (1999); Gary E. Bolton & Axel
Ockenfels, ERC—A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity and Competition, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 166
(2000)).
274. See id. at 50 (discussing Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and
Economics, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 1281 (1993); Martin Dufwenberg & Georg Kirchsteiger, A
Theory of Sequential Reciprocity, 47 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 268 (2004)).
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to act as she will. If that is the case, by misbehaving herself she
exposes others to inequity (in the form of risk or damage) while she
reaps the immediate gains from disclosing information. If she is
sufficiently averse to doing that, this may suffice to support an
environment where little potentially critical information leaks out.
Yet the more this individual is skeptical about the behavior of others
on that same platform, the more she faces the risk of being herself the
one who suffers from their irresponsible behavior. That would lead to
disadvantageous inequity. In line with the experimental evidence,
models of inequity aversion tend to show that the disutility from
being exploited is more pronounced than the disutility from being an
275
exploiter. Yet if the individual is sufficiently optimistic about the
behavior of relevant others, the risk of being exploited herself
becomes negligible.
The difficulty with inequity aversion is that it may cause groups
to coordinate on bad outcomes. If being treated equally is more
important to individuals than being treated well (in the absolute
sense), groups may choose to coordinate on the easier and worse
every-person-for-herself defection outcome in a social dilemma,
rather than on the harder and better coordinated outcome that
maximizes social welfare. Applying this insight to the privacy context,
one is more likely to cooperate in an environment in which each
person is perceived to benefit from privacy equally. If privacy
protections are perceived to yield unequal benefits, individuals are
more likely to defect, especially if they fear being disadvantaged.
Inequity aversion may explain the strength of the “nothing-to-hide”
fallacy that plagues privacy discussions. The claim does not at first
make sense: as Daniel Solove has repeatedly argued, even those with
276
nothing to hide suffer nonzero costs of surveillance. Why then resist
privacy rules that benefit both oneself and others? One possible
answer suggested by the experimental evidence above is that
individuals may assume that bad actors benefit from privacy more

275. See Ernst Fehr & Klaus Schmidt, A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation,
114 Q.J. Econ. 817, 822 (1999). For the empirics, see Mariana Blanco, Dirk Engelmann & HansTheo Normann, A Within-Subject Analysis of Other-Regarding Preferences, 72 GAMES & ECON.
BEHAV. 321, 321–37 (2011).
276. See Daniel J. Solove, Why Privacy Matters Even If You Have Nothing to Hide, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC. (May 15, 2011), https://chronicle.com/article/Why-Privacy-Matters-Even-if/
127461 [http://perma.cc/T2TA-J2FB] (“With the disclosure of secrets, the harm is that your
concealed information is spread to others. With the peeping Tom, the harm is that you’re being
watched.”).
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than other people. Because the bulk of the population consider
themselves not to be bad actors, they consider themselves
comparatively disadvantaged by such an outcome. It is difficult to
find any other reason to resist rules that offer a small benefit to me
and a large benefit to someone else. The difference in outcome may
generate aversion to producing the benefit.
Leveraging inequity aversion to create privacy will have two
components. First, education initiatives could focus on the benefit of
privacy to each person and smoothing out perceptions of unequal
outcomes in privacy protection. Second, initiatives could help
coordinate users on the better equality option of group cooperation,
rather than the worse equality option of individual defection.
Inequity-averse groups want everyone to be equal—equally well off,
or equally harmed. By anchoring expectation on the equal benefits of
privacy to all, rather than the dystopian equality of no privacy at all,
such initiatives may focus the effect of inequity aversion on
generating socially positive outcomes.
Reciprocity, the other explanation for conditional cooperation,
focuses on perceived intentions rather than outcomes. If reciprocity is
the driving force, conditional cooperation obtains if the individual
observes or believes that a sufficient fraction of the relevant others is
277
acting in good faith. We may refuse to participate in the production
of public goods because we do not trust others to participate.
Conversely, we may be willing to cooperate on the condition that we
receive sufficiently strong evidence of others’ intent. Thus, “studies
have found that players are much more likely to cooperate in a social
278
dilemma when they expect their fellow players to cooperate.”
Evidence of outcomes may or may not be informative about others’
intentions. If the other person’s actions directly and predictably
caused harm to the conditional cooperator, the cooperator might
reasonably infer bad intent. More importantly, if the other person
could have acted to cause clear harm, and did not, trust may build,
fostering cooperation on group goals. On the other hand, if one were
able to prove that a negative outcome was caused by random chance,
and not by the bad intent of other group members, a conditional
cooperator motivated by reciprocity would continue to be willing to
cooperate despite a bad outcome.
277. Blair & Stout, supra note 42, at 1772 (“Studies have found that players are much more
likely to cooperate in a social dilemma when they expect their fellow players to cooperate.”).
278. Id.
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Applied to online privacy, reciprocity theory yields significantly
different policy suggestions than does inequity aversion. For example,
reciprocity could work to sustain cooperation with respect to
correlated information, as with the typical picture in which others
feature together with me. In such a case, the outcome provides good
information about the intent of the poster. For eBay, Instagram,
Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, and other channels that permit actions
from which intention can be inferred, reciprocity can be expected to
play a significant role. But information about intentions is much more
difficult to get if the main risk is other people providing grist for
better pattern recognition by machine learning algorithms. What is
needed is an expression of the positive intentions of others.
Advertisements where one actor deletes an embarrassing photo of
someone else, or advertising campaigns highlighting steps one can
take to protect the privacy of others will help to generate a sense of
positive intent on the part of other group members. Testimonials,
repeat experience, or reputation-rating systems for friends within
narrow social circles can help build a sense of who is trustworthy and
279
who is not. This trust building within social circles cuts against the
current approach, which is to promote through schools and
advertising that no one can be trusted online. That approach triggers
negative views of others’ intentions, causing conditional cooperation
to fail as each person seeks to protect herself alone. Indeed, the
negative view of others’ intentions would cause reciprocity-based
conditional cooperation to fail even without any experienced negative
consequences of others’ bad actions.
C. Tools to Resist Social Dilemmas
The tools that foster coordination in groups are different from
those needed by individuals to protect their private interests. The
economics literature, both experimental and classical, indicate four
tools designers can use to increase group coordination: the marginal
value of investing in the public good, the ability of members to
communicate with one another, the possibility of sending a targeted
reaction (often a sanction) to those whose behavior an individual
condemns, and changing the light in which individuals view the
privacy dilemma. This Subpart addresses each tool in turn.

279. Of course, this remedy itself partly creates a new challenge to privacy, much like a
medicine having side effects.
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1. Marginal Per-Capita Return. As long as the return from
individual private investment exceeds the individual marginal payoff
from the public good, neoclassical theory would predict that
individuals would continue to defect completely regardless of the
cooperation or defection of all other players. If neoclassical theory
were correct, marginal increases in the payout players receive from
contributing to a public good would not positively impact
cooperation, until the individual payout for public-good investment
exceeded the individual reward for being selfish. In the experimental
literature, however, group cooperation is improved significantly by
280
increasing the marginal payoff of contributing.
In the lab,
cooperation increases as the ratio of payout for investing in a public
good rises relative to the level of payout on investments in purely
281
private gain. The effect is confirmed and powerful.
The important policy question for privacy is whether modest
incremental increases in the value of privacy-seeking behavior are
useful, or whether we must raise the individual payoff of investment
in privacy until it exceeds the value of selfish behavior, thus dissolving
the social dilemma. The experimental results lead us to believe that
increasing the payoff from privacy-seeking behavior, or decreasing
the payoff from ignoring the side effects on others’ privacy for that
matter, will encourage public coordination on better privacy
282
outcomes even if careless behavior remains individually profitable.
We do not have to raise the payout from privacy-seeking to a level
higher than the individual payout from using privacy-intrusive
283
services. A modest marginal increase in the payoff of privacyseeking behavior ought to increase the overall amount of privacy
society produces.

280. See Ledyard, supra note 10, at 141.
281. See Ledyard, supra note 10, at 150 (surveying the literature on increased MPCR).
282. See Thomas R. Palfrey & Jeffrey E. Prisbrey, Anomalous Behavior in Public Goods
Experiments: How Much and Why?, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 829, 830 (1997). One of us has shown
that the marginal per-capita rate not only has an effect on the level of contributions in a public
good, but also on their sustainability. See Theodore Eisenberg & Christoph Engel, Assuring
Civil Damages Adequately Deter: A Public Good Experiment, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
301, 301–49 (2014). Note, however, that the experiment is framed differently. It is concerned
with the deterrent effect of an obligation to pay damages, and manipulates the certainty and the
severity of this sanction. Yet effectively this translates into a difference of the marginal percapita rate of contributing to the public good, which increases the expected value of the
sanction.
283. See Palfrey & Prisbrey, supra note 282, at 830.
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Law can facilitate such humble increases in payout by providing
even limited and incremental increases in the benefit consumers
receive from engaging in privacy-seeking behavior. These approaches
are often overlooked because they do not completely solve problems,
but only provide a little bit of additional benefit. For example,
permitting consumers to exercise per-permission control of the
information that flows to and from their mobile apps—letting them
revoke location-information permissions, or in-app purchase, or
phone identity information—would not create comprehensive privacy
protection. But it would help a bit. The experimental results lead us
to believe that even these modest and incremental improvements can
help to encourage positive behavior.
Another practicable way to increase the payout for privacyseeking behavior is to provide consumers with a method for
communicating their expectations and an enforcement mechanism to
ensure those expectations are met. For example, one might consider
the current dearth of enforcement surrounding consumer-set do-not284
track flags. The flag is a feature in every mainstream browser.
Consumers must incur time costs to understand and set the do-nottrack flag in their browser. Even if they do so, however, companies
continue to take the “no” of a consumer as a “yes.” Regulatory
agencies have not enforced consumers’ preferences. As a result, the
investment of time by the consumer in understanding and configuring
even this most basic privacy technology yields no return. This
corrodes consumer willingness to invest in even minimal privacyseeking behavior. It would be neither legally nor technically
complicated to require companies to respect consumers’ choices.
Doing so would raise the payoff for the consumer’s investment in
privacy, causing those within the population who are willing to
cooperate at this higher payoff to do so. In short, the MPCR
literature suggests that small, incremental, and above all politically
feasible measures to increase the payout from consumers’ privacyseeking behavior are well worth the candle even if they fall short of
making investment in privacy yield benefits greater than selfinterested behavior.

284. See Fred B. Campbell Jr., The Slow Death of ‘Do-Not-Track’, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/27/opinion/the-slow-death-of-do-not-track.html?_r=0
[http://perma.cc/4W5E-32LB].
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2. Communication. Because social dilemmas are a coordination
problem, communication is a powerful tool to foster group
285
cooperation. Groups that can communicate can coordinate, and
286
those that cannot are severely hampered. As an intuitive matter,
therefore, the presence of robust means of communicating between
group members ought to be a good way for them to coordinate on the
creation of public goods like privacy. However, neoclassical theory
predicts that communication will have no impact on a social dilemma.
In a dilemma, each player should defect no matter what other players
do. This prediction holds regardless of what other players might say
287
about their intentions.
Experiments have again shown some interesting divergence from
neoclassical theory. In experiments, permitting participants to
identify and communicate with one another increases the provision of
288
public goods. Lifting the veil of complete anonymity powerfully
289
increases cooperation in dilemma situations. Cooperation further
290
increases if individuals have a chance to talk to each other, and if
they are given the ability to check and verify whether their fellow
291
participants have followed through on their announced intentions.
Cheap, nonbinding talk does not appear to increase contributions.
Rather, the effect appears to rely on communication occurring in a
setting in which group members can assess the commitment of other
292
players to contributing to the public good. Two broad causes of the
effect have been posited from this research: the ability to
communicate may promote mutual promises to cooperate, or it may
293
build group identity and cohesion.
285. See Ledyard, supra note 10, at 141.
286. See Rick K. Wilson & Jane Sell, “Liar, Liar . . .”: Cheap Talk and Reputation in
Repeated Public Goods Settings, 41 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 695, 697 (1997) [hereinafter Wilson &
Sell, Liar Liar].
287. See Ledyard, supra note 10, at 156 (“If there is a unique dominant strategy equilibrium,
as is true of most experiments without thresholds, then talking should have no effect on rates of
contribution: we should see none.”).
288. See Ledyard, supra note 10, at 156.
289. Bruno S. Frey & Iris Bohnet, Identification in Democratic Society, 26 J. SOCIO-ECON.
25, 27 (1997).
290. Gary Charness & Martin Dufwenberg, Promises and Partnership, 74 ECONOMETRICA
1579, 1582 (2006).
291. See Jane Sell & Rick K. Wilson, Levels of Information and Contributions to Public
Goods, 70 SOC. FORCES 107, 119 (1991); see also Ledyard, supra note 10, at 156–57 (surveying
studies that have demonstrated how verification improves cooperation).
292. See Wilson & Sell, Liar Liar, supra note 286, at 714.
293. See id. at 698.
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These results provide both some insight and challenges for the
provision of privacy online. It is difficult to imagine a digital privacy
scenario in which participants do not have some capacity to
communicate. Insofar as communication enables group coordination
on welfare-maximizing outcomes, this is positive. On the other hand,
the specific public good sought here is privacy. Identifying people and
communicating information about them in the name of privacy may
at first blush appear contradictory. The key appears to be to provide
reliable feedback about the privacy practices of actors when
compared to their past promises, not necessarily disclosing further
information about the actor’s real-world identity. For example, it is
not at all common practice for participants in laboratory experiments,
even those testing communication, to share real names or other
identifying information, yet their ability to communicate during the
experiment helps sustain cooperation. Pseudonymity is not merely
failed anonymity—pseudonyms permit people to build stable
reputations and relationships and communicate with one another
while limiting the real-world information they must reveal. For
example, an eBay seller can develop a reputation for honest dealing
under a pseudonym without revealing her true name, email address,
telephone number, or address. Pseudonymous communication
permits users to coordinate actions and convey information about
past practices without exposing greater amounts of personal
information.
3. Sanction. Some individuals do not care about others, or they
even enjoy seeing them in trouble. Happily, they constitute a minority
294
of those populations that have been rigorously tested. But for those
in the population who remain indifferent to the costs of their
behavior to others, identification and communication open up the
295
possibility of shaming. Shaming is a social sanction, which is
frequently used as a reaction to informational damage. Spread rumors
about a sister-in-law, and expect to be ostracized at family gatherings.
Air dirty laundry on Facebook, and expect to be defriended.
Such commonsense intuitions are borne out in the public-goods
experimental literature. Studies repeatedly show that the availability

294. See Joseph Henrich et al., “Economic Man” in Cross-Cultural Perspective: Behavioral
Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies, 28 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 795, 798 (2005).
295. William S. Neilson, A Theory of Kindness, Reluctance, and Shame for Social
Preferences, 66 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 394, 394–403 (2009).
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of social sanctions is a very effective technology for securing the
296
provision of a public good. However, sanctions often cost the
297
sanctioning party. Not only does sanctioning activity cost the
sanctioning party, it also gives rise to follow-on repercussions. If one
person polices the environment, she bears the risk that others might
298
pursue a vendetta against her. Even if one considers the risk of gang
up or the costs of imposing sanctions to be small, most people find it
unpleasant to assume the role of the cop. In the technical language of
welfare economics, vigilance and sanctioning are contributions to a
299
second-order public good. Yet the experimental evidence suggests
that, from a policy perspective, one has to be much less concerned
about this second-order public good, compared with the original firstorder public good. Society can rely on people being upset about
others misbehaving, and trying to get them under control.
In principle, this is good news for the protection of privacy.
Informal sanction and social ostracism for bad actors is the norm
across many online platforms. Features of most platforms support
some form of sanction, from defriending to downvoting to
shadowbanning, and such sanctions have the additional effect of
limiting access to private information by the offender. If I act
irresponsibly on a social network, for example, I will be defriended
and my access to in-group-only information will be revoked. If I act
irresponsibly on a discussion site by revealing the personal details of
other posters, I will be banned. Yet sanction depends on repeat play

296. See, e.g., Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Altruistic Punishment in Humans, 415 NATURE
137, 137–39 (2002); Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods
Experiments, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 980, 980 (2000).
297. See Martin Sefton, Robert Shupp & James M. Walker, The Effect of Rewards and
Sanctions in Provision of Public Goods, 45 ECON. INQUIRY 671, 673 (2007).
298. This is not a merely theoretical risk. It even materializes under the controlled
conditions of the lab. See generally Nikos S. Nikiforakis & Dirk Engelmann, Altruistic
Punishment and the Threat of Feuds, 78 J. ECON. BEHAV. ORG. 319 (2011) (finding that onequarter of all punishments are retaliated); Nikos S. Nikiforakis, Punishment and CounterPunishment in Public Good Games: Can We Really Govern Ourselves?, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 91
(2008) (finding that subjects will severely punish their victims in order to deprive their victims of
the funds to retaliate).
299. See generally Douglas D. Heckathorn, Collective Action and the Second-Order FreeRider Problem, 1 RATIONALITY & SOC’Y 78 (1989) (describing how sanctioning systems
manifest in second-level, or intragroup, collective-action problems); Toshio Yamagishi, The
Provision of a Sanctioning System as a Public Good, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 110,
111 (1986) (“[A]ssuming that people who have developed the goal of mutual cooperation . . .
cooperate for the implementation of the needed structural change . . . rather than simply
engaging in cooperative actions in the original public good situation . . . .”).
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and identification, discussed above. In order for a group to impose a
sanction, they must know who has defected against group interest,
and they must have a mechanism that can deter future defection.
Future defection only matters if the member to be sanctioned is a
member of a group with the potential to cooperate in the future that
can identify and sanction the offender. Mediating the balance
between sanction and privacy can be challenging, but good solutions
are already in place. Distributed database technology based on
trustless public ledgers, such as that used by World Table or other
distributed-ledger comment-curating systems, permit users to create
persistent pseudonymous identities across multiple platforms—a
worldwide online pseudonymous reputation. Once they do, the
reputation of the pseudonym can serve as a sanctionable resource.
Those with established reputations will be trusted. Those without will
not, because they—like eBay sellers with no reputation ranking—will
be perceived as attempting to avoid sanction.
4. Framing. Mathematically, public goods and public bads are
301
identical. We have found the public-bad story convincing, since in a
public-bad game the cooperative decision is not to contribute to the
public bad, just as with social media one strong cooperative decision
is not to contribute data that bears on or concerns others. Yet it may
be that psychologically speaking, conceiving of privacy as a public
good could have a salutary effect on attempts to help groups control
302
third-party-generated information online.
In a highly cited
experiment, James Andreoni demonstrated that framing impacts
contributions to a public good, or, conversely, abstention from
303
contributing to a public bad. The pessimistic view of a public bad, or
a “cold prickle” as Andreoni described it, seemed to encourage
304
defection. The optimistic view of a public good seemed to engender
contribution to the public good, described by Andreoni as a “warm

300. One straightforward way to avoid identification is making negative information about
others available in an anonymous way (which presupposes that the victim may not, at least,
suspect who has made the information publicly known).
301. See Andreoni, supra note 9, at 5.
302. See Hartzog & Stutzman, supra note 128, at 417.
303. See Andreoni, supra note 9, at 2.
304. See id. at 13 (“[W]hen the positive externality is rephrased to be presented as a
negative externality—even though the incentives do not change—the provision of the public
good . . . [collapses] after ten iterations . . . .”).

FAIRFIELD AND ENGEL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

PRIVACY AS A PUBLIC GOOD

11/20/2015 3:26 PM

455

305

glow.” In short, even though the decision to contribute private
information that impacts others may be most accurately described as
a public bad, it may perhaps be usefully described to groups seeking
to avoid the negative effects of this bad as a public good. In discussing
the problem with the public, it may well be better to encourage socialnetwork participants to protect the privacy of other members of their
social network than to avoid contributing to the pools of data that can
have toxic effects on those members. The one construction may
create a warm glow, while the other yields only a cold prickle.
The economic literature refers to such interventions as “valence
framing”: the structure of the interaction, or its payoffs, are
represented in some alternative form. An even more subtle
306
intervention is called “label framing.” Some cue evokes some
context that, one has reason to believe, will change how individuals
act. For instance, it has been shown that experimental participants are
much more likely to cooperate in a dilemma game if this game is
307
called a “community game,” rather than a “Wall Street game.”
Likewise, participants cooperate more if the situation is described as
a “joint project” or “jointly protecting against danger,” rather than
308
“competition.”
Given this, it matters more than ever how society talks about
privacy. If those seeking to jointly protect themselves against
commercial and government exploiters of data do face a public-goods
problem, as this Article has sought to demonstrate, it may help to
name it as such. Too few seem to see their information-sharing
behavior in that light. The experimental evidence suggests that it
might be helpful just to let them know. Merely encouraging people to
contribute to the public good of privacy may drive up investment in
privacy-protecting behavior.
Conversely, if society continues to debate privacy in purely
individualistic terms, as it has largely done until this point, the

305. See id. (“People are significantly more willing to cooperate in a public goods
experiment when the problem is posed as a positive externality rather than as a negative
externality.”).
306. See Martin Dufwenberg, Simon Gächter & Heike Hennig-Schmidt, The Framing of
Games and the Psychology of Play, 73 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 459, 461–62 (2011).
307. See Lee Ross & Andrew Ward, Naive Realism in Everyday Life: Implications for Social
Conflict and Misunderstanding, in VALUES AND KNOWLEDGE 103, 106–08 (Edward S. Reed,
Elliot Turiel & Terrance Brown eds., 1996).
308. Christoph Engel & David Rand, What Does “Clean” Really Mean? The Implicit
Framing of Decontextualized Experiments, 122 ECON. LETTERS 386, 387 (2014).
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experimental evidence indicates that the individual focus will lead to
underprovision of privacy. An “every-person-for-herself” mentality
will predominate, reducing cooperative behavior. Worse, as
individuals fail in the face of the social dilemma, they will be
individually blamed. Under the individual privacy narrative, people
who do not benefit from privacy must not be trying hard enough, or
must not value privacy after all. This Article has taken an initial step
toward countering this narrative, by naming the dilemma of privacy
for what it is, and by encouraging a positive framing for a
longstanding conundrum of social interaction: privacy is a public
good.
CONCLUSION
There is some ground for optimism in the otherwise grim field of
data privacy. The current dominant approach of focusing on
individual education and empowerment has fallen short. This has led
to the strange rise of privacy nihilism, that is, the claim that since
consumers cannot get privacy, they must not want it. The focus on
individual empowerment underemphasizes the group or community
dimension of privacy.
The focus on empowering individuals has induced policymakers
to overlook important tools for protecting privacy. The relevant
privacy unit is the group, rather than the individual. Social dilemmas
pit individuals against each other, and individual incentives cut
against group welfare. In many ways, the more educated and
empowered individuals are, the worse the social dilemma becomes for
the group.
Features of the privacy debate function in ways that are similar
to a social dilemma. The well-known public-good (public-bad)
dilemma best matches the contours of the privacy debate. It does not
exclude other models. We merely claim that individual-focused
approaches have reached diminishing returns, and that approaches
focused on groups may yield more fruit for the investment. The
public-goods model has a broad range of tools suggested by the
theoretical and experimental economic literatures that have gone
underexplored thus far in the privacy debate.
In exploring these tools, we note a debate internal to the
economics literature that has important ramifications for the study of
privacy. Classical economic theory predicts that many tools groups
use to increase cooperation should have no effect: in the face of a
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social dilemma, all cooperation should collapse. Experimentalists
have on the other hand consistently confirmed that groups resist
social dilemmas to the benefit of the group and to individual
members’ detriment, and that certain tools help. Whether this
resistance to social dilemmas is learned and becomes a heuristic over
a lifetime of confronting such situations, or whether humans innately
struggle against social dilemmas, we take this struggle as a sign of
hope.
This Article proposes giving groups tools for this struggle.
Policymakers should consider the size, composition, and cohesion of
online groups when they attempt to create an environment conducive
to privacy protection. Tools should not be centered on individual
rights of review and deletion, which have proven largely ineffective.
Rather, tools should focus on group communication, sanction, and
fostering a sense of repeat play and community. Even the way that we
speak about the nature of the problem can have an impact on
whether people cooperate to produce the public good of privacy.
The highest aspiration of an academic article is not to settle a
debate, but to spur further inquiry. We do not claim to have identified
the best solutions from a legal policy perspective, and we believe that
much fruitful behavioral-economic research is yet to come. We hope,
however, that the door is now open, and that the overindividualized
approach to privacy protection will yield to a more balanced debate
about the tensions between individuals and groups in the privacy
context.

